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The question of Islam as a political force is a vital question of our 
times, and will be for several years to come. The precondition for 
its treatment with a minimum of intelligence is probably not to start 
from a platform of hatred.  
Michel Foucault 
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I. Abstract 
“Political Islam” in political sciences and sociological study is mainly treated through prisms 
of normative and sociological institutionalism. The connection of politics and norms is an 
important field that tends to be viewed first and foremost from a vantage point of cultural 
relativism based on anthropological work. The network as an analytical tool for understanding 
this nexus is a novel approach. The network here is defined as any cluster of social ties.  
Viewing Muslim societies through the network prism is enriching to sociology and political 
sciences, since it awards the necessary importance to the networked characteristics of these 
societies: they are alive, grow and evolve; just like a network constantly evolves and grows by 
forging new ties between actors. By taking into account the insights of social network theory 
and social capital theory as well as empirical data on the networked characteristics of the Saudi 
Arabian society and the particularities of the political apparatus in Saudi Arabia, this research 
will contribute to the understanding of political institutions in Muslim-majority countries by 
approaching the existence and influence of Islamic norms from a network theoretical 
perspective. Drawing on social capital theory and social network theory with empirical 
observations obtained from the Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Data Set as well 
as various secondary anthropological sources, the research seeks to explore the explanatory 
merits of social network theory for the understanding of the prevalence of Islamic norms in the 
public spheres of Muslim majority countries.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Politics, unlike religion, is a realm not of eternal truths, but of rational calculations.  
To govern effectively, one must build alliances and coalitions,  
including with secular and liberal parties.  
Shlomo Ben-Ami 
 
One of the major assumptions in the field of public administration and especially institutional 
analysis is that it is institutions that govern and steer the behaviours of individual and 
organisational actors. Institutional analysis has not yet shed any light, however, on how this 
process works (Lin, 2001). Normative institutionalism claims that actors conform to a logic of 
appropriateness, but this says little about where those standards of appropriateness come from 
or how they might change. One central question in normative institutionalism is how norms 
affect state behaviour. To answer this question, it is necessary to separate norms from the actual 
state behaviour. For example, advocating the implementation of shari’a law is not a norm, but 
a behaviour resulting from a norm. Advocating the structuring of the financial system in 
accordance to Islamic finance is not a norm, but a behaviour resulting from a norm. How do 
individuals learn the rules, and why should they subscribe to them? How are organizations 
matched with individual actors to improve their institutional resources and thus their chances 
for survival? In other words, what are the social mechanisms that credit and enforce the 
compliance of individual actors and organisations with institutional rituals and behaviours? 
(Lin 2001: 185). 
One of the most common arguments for the existence and prevalence of political Islam relate 
to the nature of the authoritarian political systems as a path-dependent result of colonial history 
and the development of rentierism through oil wealth.  For example, Ayoob (2008) analyses 
that  
“the repressive and unrepresentative nature of many regimes in the Muslim world has 
both provided the political space for and augmented the popularity of Islamist political 
formations. […] The nature of the political system and of regimes in many Muslim 
countries have had and continue to have major impact on the growth of political Islam 
and the strategies adopted by Islamists in these countries. This variable is likely to 
influence the future trajectory of Islamism in substantial measure.” (2008: 155)  
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Ayoob finds a positive correlation between the authoritarian nature of regimes and the appeal 
of political Islam, thus stipulating that the continuous existence of authoritarian and repressive 
rule in Muslim-majority countries is the main explanation for the continuous existence of 
political Islam (Ayoob, 2008).  
Extending this logic further, Fawcett suggests that Islamic groups have been particularly 
successful in building a broad array of associational groups with the intention of filling 
vacuums of services that are not fulfilled by the governments or the private sectors of most 
Muslim-majority countries (Fawcett, 2005). Islamic groups – especially those with political 
aspiration – sweep in to fill the welfare-gap and provide various services and financial relief to 
fellow Muslims, where the state fails to do so (Harrigan and El-Said, 2009). Fawcett draws 
attention to the underestimation of the persistence of Islam as a value system in Middle Eastern 
societies and the integration of helping the needy as a pillar of Islam itself. She claims further 
that it cannot be expected to witness secular values in associational life, since those values are 
often perceived as contradictory to Islamic values (Fawcett, 2005). As we will develop later, 
associational groups serve to confirm (Islamic) values and norms via the promotion of certain 
behaviours, in this case providing services to those in need.   
Where, however, does this prevalence of Islamic norms originate from? This research aims at 
taking another step back, in order to establish an understanding of the continuous prevalence 
of Islamic norms in Muslim countries’ public life that nurture political Islam. Why do Islamic 
norms continue to prevail as the governing social and moral construct in Muslim-majority 
countries that are situated in and connected to a largely secularised international community? 
Why are the Quran and Islamic beliefs considered to command what politics should be, when 
historically most governments have emancipated themselves from religious doctrine 
concerning state and governance? The theories that have so far been applied to comprehend 
and explain this empirical phenomenon have left these questions unanswered.  
In his work on the interplay of Islam and politics in Saudi society, Madawi Al Rasheed offers 
quite a charming opening that illustrates the continued prominence of Islamic values in Saudi 
society: 
“Nothing exemplifies the enchantment of Saudi society like a local television 
programme called Fatwa on Air, a special performance normally hosting a religious 
scholar who responds to questions posed by the public. The programme started in the 
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1660s and continues to the present day. A scholar issues religious opinions regarding 
the questions asked. Callers usually ask very specific questions. A woman wants to 
know whether menstruating for three weeks qualifies as menstruation, thus preventing 
her from performing prayers. A man asks whether it is permissible to borrow money to 
allow his mother to perform pilgrimage. A third person asks whether high heels are 
permissible for women and whether diamond rings are legitimate accessory for men. 
The repetitiveness and regularity of these television programmes confirm Saudi society 
as obsessively concerned with the ritualistic aspect of Islam.” (Al-Rasheed, 2007: 60) 
One part of the puzzle is the relationship between civil society and the state; how certain forms 
of governance influence the participation of civil society in policymaking and thereby the 
transmission of political and social ideologies, norms and values in the public sphere. The 
scientific community, mainly in the debate on social capital, has produced quite some insight 
on this part of the puzzle, underpinned with empirical evidence from the US (see for example 
Putnam, 1966, Coleman, 1998 and 1990), post-Soviet Russia (Rose, 1995), Tanzania (Narayan 
and Pritchett, 1996), Brazil (Tendler, 1997), East Asia (Stiglitz, 1996) etc. However, there 
exists a gap in the literature on social capital applying the theory to Saudi Arabia and the role 
of social capital in governance and the involvement of civil society in particular. A second part 
of the puzzle is the anthropological component of the regional specificities of the Middle East 
and Saudi Arabia in particular. Many local anthropologists (notably Saad Sowayan in his 
several works) have conducted structural analyses of tribal networks and networks of kinship, 
family and associational life in Saudi Arabia. However, most of his work that offers insights 
into the interplay of these networks and governance are published in Arabic and are blind to 
the connection between the institutionalist approach, the analysis of social capital and social 
network theory. 
Explaining the prevalence of political Islam by analysing the political voids that Islamic norms 
fill must be considered a circular argument, as any ideology could perform with the same effect. 
There would be no ideology of political Islam, if Islamic norms weren’t widely accepted as an 
ideological alternative to the incumbent regimes of Muslim-majority countries. In other words, 
instead of explaining the prevalence of political Islam by analysing the political voids that 
Islamic norms fill, this research seeks to find a way to explain the prevalence of political Islam 
by exploring why Islamic norms still work so effectively to mobilise people, to rally support 
and to unite civil society. For this, I set out to explore the explanatory merits of a theoretical 
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angle that has so far not been applied to the situation, namely social network theory. In 
summary, this research seeks to answer the following research question: 
Given that Muslim-majority countries show an apparent lack of secularisation in politics and 
given that Islamic norms are kept alive and relevant in the public spheres of Muslim-majority, 
to what extent does social network theory inform our understanding of the continuously 
unsecularised politics of Muslim-majority countries and the continued prevalence of Islamic 
norms in the political sphere as the basis for policy-making and the mobilisation of support for 
political decisions? 
In this research, I aim to integrate findings from anthropological research as well as political 
science research with insights only available in Arabic language on particular regional and 
historical contexts to fill the aforementioned gap in the literature and to provide an empirical 
contribution to the debate on norm prevalence and social capital. In order to achieve this, I will 
draw on social capital theory and social network theory. As I will develop in the theory section 
of this research, social capital theory is closely entangled with the structural analysis of social 
networks, but insights from social network theory may serve better to shed light on some 
aspects of the puzzle that would otherwise be left in the dark. The two theories should thus not 
be synthesised but should complement each other where one theory alone would leave gaps in 
the comprehensive understanding of the puzzle at hand. It is important here to notice that there 
is an analytical difference in the systems theory of networks and the theory of social networks. 
The former engages in the structural analysis of networks whereas the latter – which will be 
used here – simply considers networks as a kind of social order and engages in the exploration 
of the construction and destruction of social ties (Karafillidis, 2012). 
The theoretical foundation for this research is thus built on two theories that tackle the issue of 
social order by calling on social networks and identity-based collective action and thus offer a 
suitable starting point for explaining a topic that is in itself easy to describe, yet inconclusively 
embedded in and analysed by theory (Leonard, 2004). Social capital theory will allow us to 
gain an understanding about how norms and values embedded as social capital in social ties 
based on trust and good sentiment govern behaviour. Having established that political Islam is 
a social phenomenon whose values provide the basis for political bargaining, social capital 
theory as hitherto developed falls short, however, to actually clarify how Islamic networks 
contribute to identity formation. In order to solidify political Islam as a networked phenomenon 
that embeds citizens of Muslim countries in certain political trajectories, social capital theory 
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needs to be complemented with ideas from social network theory. Harrison White’s social 
network theory allows us to build a framework of social organisation through which we can 
understand political Islam as a product of a society whose functioning is based largely on 
networks of kinship and tribal affiliation. Said framework of social organisation, or social 
structure, is defined here as consisting of “(1) a set of social units (positions) that possess 
differential amounts of one or more types of valued resources and that (2) are hierarchically 
related relative to authority (control of and access to resources), (3) share certain rules and 
procedures in the use of the resources, and (4) are entrusted to occupants (agents) who act on 
these rules and procedures” (Lin, 2001: 33)1. Within these social constructs, networks develop 
that defend and pass on Islamic values, linked closely to political prestige, social standing and 
normative appropriateness.  
The empirical data for this research has been found in existing scholarly literature, a broad 
array of secondary sources and the Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Data Set. 
Drawing on Saudi Arabia as a case study is crucial for the exploration of social network 
theory’s explanatory merit for the empirical phenomenon at hand. As such, the case of Saudi 
Arabia is reflective of a highly networked society whose functioning is based on kinship and 
tribal affiliation. Furthermore, the political apparatus is structured around the Al Saud royal 
family and clearly orients itself on the Quran and Sharia law. The empirical analysis of data on 
Saudi Arabia’s social structure and the social capital embedded therein serves as an indicator 
of whether the relationship between social capital embedded in social ties and the continuous 
prevalence or Islamic norms as a basis for policymaking – as proposed by the theories drawn 
on for this research - would hold in the most likely case. The difficulty of using Saudi Arabia 
as a case study quite obviously lies in the data unavailability and the uncertainty about the 
validity of data that has been collected from government sources. Nonetheless, since I am able 
to access Arabic sources that have produced empirical data on the anthropological component 
of the prevalence of political Islam to an extent that has so far not been achieved in the English-
speaking scientific community, this research explores novel theoretical angles and territory to 
apply existing theories to.  
The first part of the research builds the theoretical foundation of the research that is essential 
to grasp the subsequent analysis. After introducing social capital theory and social network 
theory, an ontological conceptualisation of networked social capital, based on the propositions 
                                                          
1 Lin 2001: “For related discussion, see Sewell 1992” 
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the theories forward, deduced. The second part of the research begins by introducing the case 
study of Saudi Arabia. We will then continue to lay out the empirical observations obtained 
from the Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Data Set and various anthropological 
accounts that pertain to the propositions deduced from the theory. We will touch on the role of 
trust between the government and the Saudi society in producing social capital among citizens, 
the importance of family and tribal networks for the transmission and confirmation and thus 
the keeping-alive of Islamic norms, the influence that people in powerful positions of the Saudi 
society have over the maintenance of social order in conformity to Islamic norm, the 
importance of Islam as a source of Saudi identity in the place of nationalism which never 
functioned to unify Saudi in loyalty to the government and the importance of overlapping 
network membership for the formation of a Saudi Islamic identity. The final section will then 
draw conclusions about the appropriateness and fruitfulness of using social network theory to 
explain the prevalence of Islamic norms in the public spheres of Muslim–majority countries. 
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2. Theory 
2.1. Social capital theory 
Since the 1966 publication of Putnam’s work “Political Attitudes and the Local Community” 
on the interplay of social capital and the more efficient functioning of governance and 
democracy, both social capital and especially the concept of trust have been studied as potential 
determinants of democracy and effective governance (Alexander, 2007). The concept of trust 
in the social capital debate serves as a “form of lubrication in the political system” (Aberg, 
2000) that is thought to “[smoothen] the interactive process by which the elected government 
responds to the demands of the citizens” (Aberg, 2000). According to Putnam’s definition, 
social capital then is defined as “features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and 
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” 
(Putnam, as quoted in Aberg, 2000). The takeaway from this definition is that social capital 
should be understood as the quality of reciprocal connections between people that undergo 
exchanges. Considering this interpretation of social capital, it becomes very clear why the study 
of social capital has always been closely connected to the study of networks: if society is 
understood in terms of its relational property, networks of civic engagement form, including 
interest groups and political parties. These networks foster trust in institutions represented by 
the state (Aberg, 2000). 
The conceptual frameworks of social capital stretch from early definitions such as Hanifan’s 
view of social capital as referring to “those tangible assets [that] count for most in the daily 
lives of people: namely goodwill, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the 
individuals and families who make up a social unit” (Woolcock as quoted in Feldman and 
Assaf, 1999), over to the most prominent views of social capital as “a set of horizontal 
associations [and hierarchical power structures] between people which foster cooperation for 
the mutual benefit of the community” (Feldman and Assaf, 1999) forwarded by Putnam and 
Coleman, all the way to more recent views as promoted by Douglas North, who extends the 
concept of social capital to “formalised institutional relationships and structures such as 
government, the political regime, rule of law, and the court system” (Feldman and Assaf, 1999). 
The element of trust as the essential ingredient to the transmission of social capital has been 
widely discussed in the social capital debate. Scholars contend that constructive interactions 
between the micro and macro levels of a community, i.e. between civil society and government, 
are the carrying pillar of trust and thus the good relationship between the governed and the 
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government (Feldman and Assaf, 1999). For example, in his study of Russian society, Richard 
Rose finds that the high degree of distrust in the Russian government and its arm’s length civil 
society institutions resulted in Russians relying solely on family and social networks (Rose, 
1995). Rose stipulates, and Fukuyama in his work “Trust: The Social Values and the Creation 
of Prosperity” (1995) agrees, that trust arises out of a set of moral values shared by a community 
that makes possible the predictable expectation of regular and honest behaviour (see Rose, 
1995 and Fukuyama, 1995). 
Mark Granovetter in his work “Economic Action and Social Structure” (1985) adds an 
economic angle to the idea of trust as the underlying element to all social transactions. In his 
conceptualisation of social capital, Granovetter argues that economic transactions are 
embedded in social structure. This idea of embeddedness focuses on how networks of 
economic transactions, and therefrom resulting personal relationships, generate trust and 
ensure good faith in economic life (Granovetter, 1985). 
Pioneered by Granovetter, social capital has come to be understood as the investment in social 
relations with expected returns in a forum of exchange, i.e. the market place. The market here 
is not limited to an economic sphere, but it can refer to politics, the work place, the community, 
etc. In any of these forums of exchange, individuals engage in interactions and networking in 
order to generate some kind of gain by investing personal resources. Social capital then has to 
be considered as a social asset that derives its entire face value from the actor’s connections 
and access to resources in the network of the forum of exchange they take part in (Feldman and 
Assaf, 1999). 
Developing on this idea, Lin defines social capital as “resources embedded in a social structure 
which are accessed and/or mobilised in purposive actions” (Lin, 1999). In his 
conceptualisation, social capital is made up of three components that intersect structure and 
action: the structural component of resources embedded in a social structure, the opportunity 
component of such resources being accessible by actors in the social structure and the action-
oriented component of the use or mobilisation of said resources in purposive action (Lin, 1999). 
Lin argues that resources in different locations in the network yield different kinds of benefits. 
What type of network location leads to what type of resource that generates returns, depends 
on the type of return the actor expects (Lin, 1999). He develops further that the value 
assignment of resources is dictated by its availability relative to the expectations for it and adds 
that the value is also determined by the unique historical, geographical and collective context 
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of the network the resource is embedded in (Lin, 2001). It can be deduced, then, that social 
capital transcends the mere study of social relations and networks and necessitates the 
identification of network characteristics and relations such as bridges (Granovetter, 1973), 
structural holes (Burt, 1992) or betweennes, density, cohesion or closeness of social networks 
in order to capture the embeddedness of social capital resources in networks (Lin, 1999). 
To recap, the current scholarly debate on social capital understands the concept - simply put - 
as the results of investment in social relations with expected returns. But why does social 
capital work? Or in other words, why does the use of resources embedded in social networks 
enhance the outcome of actions? Lin (1999) offers a three-fold explanation for the 
phenomenon. According to him, the first explanatory component behind the functioning of 
social capital is the facilitation of the flow of information. As such, in a situation of imperfect 
distribution of information, social ties that are located in a strategic location can provide an 
actor with information about opportunities and choices that he could otherwise not access.  
The second component explaining the workings of social capital according to Lin is the social 
ties’ exercise of influence over actors who play crucial roles in decision-making effecting other 
actors. This can be the case for example when a recruiter makes a decision about hiring or 
promoting an employee. Adding to this, the strategic location of a social tie (e.g. a structural 
hole in a horizontal network or a position of power in a hierarchical network) can add more 
value to the resource located in said tie. Thus, if an actor with such a valuable social tie “puts 
in a good word” for someone, this may carry weight in the decision-making concerning another 
actor in the network. 
Lin’s third and final explanatory component is the reaffirmation of an individual’s social 
credentials through social tie resources and their acknowledged relationships to individuals. 
Social ties may thus reflect the actor’s access to resources through his social network, i.e. his 
social capital. An actor gains more value and becomes an asset to an organisation or group, 
since resources can be accessed and mobilised via this actor. This reaffirmation also reinforces 
identity and recognition, according to Lin (1999). He claims that being assured and recognised 
of one’s worthiness as an individual and valuable member of a group can provide emotional 
support and public acknowledgement of the actor’s claim over certain resources. Such 
reinforcements are crucial for securing an actor’s mental health and his entitlement to resources 
in the social network. In summary, Lin identifies three elements that explain the functioning of 
15 
 
social capital: information, influence and the attaining and reinforcement of social credentials 
(Lin, 1999). 
We have hitherto developed an understanding of social capital that emphasises the crucial role 
of ties build on trust, resources embedded in networks and norms that are shared among the 
members of this network. In a literature review on social capital, Crossley (2008) concludes 
that “all writers agree that social capital refers to the manner in which networks and their 
emergent properties (e.g. trust and norms) can constitute a resource for their members” 
(Crossley as quoted in Bunn and Wood, 2012).  
However, I agree with Bunn and Wood (2012) that it is important to make an analytical 
distinction between networks and norms, as the chicken-and-the-egg-type question of which 
existed first and strengthened the other should undoubtedly arise. Putnam (2000) views social 
capital as a commodity; something that is held by individuals or groups that is given at any 
time and quantifiable since in his view social capital is a relatively impersonal good. Drawing 
on Coleman’s (1988) and later Crossley’s (2008) view of social capital, however, social capital 
is understood as a property of social relations, accessed or mobilised through the facilitating or 
catalysing function of the social network it is embedded in (Bunn and Wood, 2012). For 
example, Crossley’s 2008 study of the network of a private health club finds that social capital 
exists to the extent that it facilitates identity-development, information gathering, collective 
action, self-recognition and service-exchange among the members of the network (Crossley, 
2008).  
Crossley’s findings prove that, contrary to Putnam’s belief, social capital is always in the 
process of being used and mobilised while social relations are exercised. It is not a constant 
commodity inherently deposited in the social ties of a network. Social capital then should not 
be understood so much in the Putnamian light of considering how quantities of social capital 
create social integration, but rather as the quality of social relations in practice (Bunn and 
Wood, 2012). Understanding social capital in such a way has to implications: First, social 
capital should not be considered as an isolated or quantifiable commodity, but rather as 
something that is always already “practically enmeshed in constellations of diverse forms of 
capital” (Bunn and Wood, 2012). This implies, in other words, that social capital is linked to 
the contextual contingencies of the environment that it is embedded in.  
Secondly, this view of social capital implies that the analysis of social capital only ever makes 
sense if the analyst considers the inequalities and distinctions between actors within the 
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network (Bunn and Wood, 2012). According to Svendsen (2006), social capital must be seen 
as unequally distributed among social groups in specific power contexts” (Svendsen as quoted 
in Bunn and Wood, 2012), thus emphasising again the importance of focusing on social 
relations rather than social integration when analysing social capital. This perspective 
reinforces the second implication outlined earlier:  
“the concept of social capital only makes sense when it is seen as a dimension of everyday 
relationships which also rely on shared cultural referents and practices [Silverman, 2001: 
243], the availability of certain levels of economic resources and, ultimately, symbolic 
recognition” (Bunn and Wood, 2012). 
These propositions deduced from social capital theory can be expected to shed quite some light 
on the question this research seeks to answer. However, as has been developed earlier, social 
capital should be considered to always be in the process of being used and mobilised while 
social relations are exercised and not as a constant commodity inherently deposited in the social 
ties of a network. We established that the quality of social relations in practice as opposed to 
the quantities of social capital create social integration. As such, the merely structural analysis 
of social networks, i.e. the structural network theory of structural holes, bridges, network 
density etc. that is inherently intertwined with social capital theory, does not suffice to analyse 
the transmission of social capital. Rather, the questions of how social networks are made and 
remade and what they consist of should be considered. For this reason, we will also draw on 
Harrison White’s network theory (as opposed to the structural analysis of networks as 
forwarded for example by Granovetter, Burt, Putnam, Provan and Kenis, or Wasserman and 
Faust) to approach the research question. 
2.2. Social network theory 
What are networks, how do they develop, how do they maintain themselves and how do 
networks deal with their environment? Originating from the question about social order, these 
are central questions that social network theory deals with. Semantically, Harrison White’s 
social network theory distances itself from the general use of the term. White sees a problem 
in using the network simultaneously as an empirical phenomenon and a tool for measurement 
as well as the narrow meaning of the term “network” that emerged out of the structural analysis 
of social networks (Karaflidis, 2012). To White, the order of any social space does not equal 
the network and he limits the term to the following two meanings: networks on the one hand 
are structural equivalences (see Lorrain and White, 1971; White, Boorman and Breiger, 1976) 
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and on the other hand a pattern that consists of ties that vary in type and intensity (see 
Granovetter, 1973). Networks to White are ultimately nothing more and nothing less than one 
of many forms of structural developments (Karaflidis, 2012). 
In order to illustrate the complexity of this theoretical approach, Harrison White uses a 
children’s playground as a metaphor in his main work “Identity and Control” (1992) to 
describe social order in simple terms. White describes that, if observed over a longer period of 
time, visible and simultaneously highly temporal and instable clusters develop out of the 
presence and organisation of playground elements, children running around and parents 
watching them. The raging chaos on the playground needs to be controlled in order to define 
one’s own position or identity in relation to all other identities present on the playground 
(White, 1992). In other words, each member of such a cluster is playing a game that relies on 
the ability of each actor to control the attraction of his identity to an extent that it remains 
attractive in the eyes of other actors. As soon as an identity loses its attraction, the respective 
actor is likely to be excluded from the social order. As such, for example, a child may 
participate in a football match for as long as he proves that he is able to perform well in the 
game (see White, 1992: 6ff).  
Being ascribed an attractive identity is a reciprocal process between all present identities: other 
players on the playground must also constantly convince an individual that their identity is still 
interesting. Referring again to the example of the football match, the competent player may 
leave the game if his team members are too weak in the game of football. As such, identity 
develops out of the quest to maintain a specific social order, during which reciprocal acts of 
control of various identities (children, parents, games, context of the playground, time, 
language, ethnic origin of the children, etc.) are constantly functioning to re-negotiate identities 
(White, 1992). It is important here to understand control not as a monopolistic claim of power, 
but as the result of reciprocal aids to orientation in the social order. As such, control creates not 
only reasonable expectations about the actions of other actors, but also an orientation for one’s 
own behaviour (Baecker, 2006).  
According to Baecker, a successful attempt to gain control produces situations and relations 
that render it attractive for both parties to continue to engage in said attempts to gain control 
and that make it attractive to external third parties to participate (Baecker, 2005). However, 
control is only possible if individuals also agree to being controlled. White provides the 
following summary of the relationship between control and identity:  
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 “Each identity continues discovering and reshaping itself in action. Identity is 
produced by contingency to which it responds as intervention in possible processes to 
come. The rush and jars of daily living are contingences, as are ill health and 
contentions of other identities. Control is both anticipation of and response to eruptions 
in environing process. Seeking control is not some option of choice, it comes out of the 
way identities get triggered and keep going. An identity is as likely to target itself as 
another for a control effort” (White, 1992: 9).  
In this passage, White emphasises that identities form as a response to environmental 
contingencies, i.e. building aids to orientation in and continuous re-evaluation of the 
environment. This in turn becomes possible only under the condition that there exists a 
mechanism of control that can anticipate environmental contingencies and has to react to them. 
As such, control places identity in a reality that identities have to deal with via the re-evaluation 
and re-positioning (White, 1992).  An individual cannot consciously steer control or plan to 
have a controlling influence over its environment. This means that control can only be 
understood in relation to one’s own identity and that of all other identities. The ties between 
identities are then not of static, mechanic nature, but at best highly fluctuating and instable 
appearances that are constantly exposed to changes based on their intensity and concreteness 
(Azarian, 2006).  
Accordingly, the world is actually defined by continuous chaos or lack of order, which can 
produce temporary instable patterns of organisation at best. Social order cannot be understood 
as fully developed assemblage of fixed network relations, but rather as a polymer goo that is 
about to harden into a more structured matter:  “[…] there is no tidy atom and no embracing 
world, only complex striations, long strings reptating as in a polymer goo, or in a mineral before 
it hardens” (White, 1992, p. 4).  
Tangible relations, in the same way as networks, are merely socially constructed abstractions 
that become visible only as there is an observer for them or someone who can make sense of 
them (White, 1992). It follows from this that networks as units of social order cannot be 
constructed or made, but only discovered. They cannot be changed, but only supported, 
disturbed or weakened and one cannot simply join or leave a network. At best, one can execute 
one’s own identity work that can function as an origin or target for new attempts to gain control 
(Baecker, 2005). The theory here underpins what has been repeatedly mentioned throughout 
previous chapters of this research: the unstable character of network-ties illustrates how 
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networks are constantly changing and evolving. This may become more comprehensible when 
considering the semantics of the terms network not only as a noun, but also as a verb “to 
network”. 
Once that network ties have been observed, stories develop. Azarian defines these stories as 
including “history, what is going on and how the relationship is expected by the actors to unfold 
in the future”. (2006: 52). On the basis of individual expectations and memories about the 
circumstances and the conditions of a relationship, each side of a tie builds its own story as 
well as a collective story in interaction with other network participants (Schmitt, 2009). As 
such, stories are descriptions of relationships in networks and serve the perception of individual 
ties and reciprocities of ties (White, 1992). Bundles of stories can be summarised in a domain. 
According to White, when these domains are extended by the construction of a network, i.e. 
observable relational ties, so called “netdoms” (network + domain) develop that provide the 
social context of ties and that each side of the tie directly or indirectly refers to. Netdoms 
consequently create certain reciprocal expectations (White, 1992). 
It now needs to be understood that an individual does not only roam within a single netdom. 
On the contrary, an individual is embedded in a myriad of more or less stable, lasting and 
intensive netdoms. Only with the help of what White coined switching (switching from being 
conscious of one’s identity and role in one netdom to being conscious of one’s identity and role 
in another netdom) can individuals navigate between netdoms. This has four essential 
implications: First, only switching allows for the development of identity. The possibility to 
find oneself not in this, but another social context, paired with the awareness that it is possible 
to change between various contexts creates the very contingency that is essential to identity 
formation (White, 1992). It follows secondly, that an individual person or organisation will not 
have a single identity, but – depending on the context – may have multiple identities. This can 
result in mutually exclusive, complementary or contradictory expectations. Thirdly, as Baecker 
suggests, networks demand from their members a certain degree of consciousness for the 
perception of and catering to the respective expectations that networks pose (2006). Potential 
attempts to gain control or re-interpretations of one’s identity require the anticipation of others’ 
reactions. Due to the embeddedness in multiple context with differing expectations, this easily 
becomes a task impossible to complete. Azarian summarises: “In short, any direct tie of an 
actor is contingently dependent on his indirect relations” (Azarian, 2006: 42). Finally, even a 
single tie between participants may be embedded in various contexts. Depending on the 
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context, an individual needs to make decisions about his behavioural patterns, which oftentimes 
can lead to reciprocal misunderstanding and disappointment. These kinds of ties are called 
multiplex ties and require a high degree of flexibility and compatibility of each network 
participant. 
According to what we have developed this far, the focus in the theorisation of social networks 
does not lie on the network itself but rather on the borders between certain networks and 
identities. This conclusion draws attention to the reciprocal making, perception and 
reproduction of a border. This means that a border is a social act and is not unilaterally decided 
upon, but rather continuously checked, updated, given up and rebuilt (White, 2012). In order 
to explain this finding further, White introduces the disciplines of interface, arena and council 
(1992). Disciplines to White are simply social formations or “social molecules” (Fuhse and 
Muetzel, 2010); the smallest unit of analysis. Disciplines are observable orientation aids to 
navigate through actions within and without a discipline. They are seen as “self-reproducing 
structural contexts, which sustain identities” (Fuhse and Muetzel, 2010: 261), as according to 
White, identities form out of the interaction of social molecules (White, 1992). Disciplines 
don’t stand alone; they are always embedded in other networks. Single identities and control 
patterns arrange themselves within disciplines in a way that ties, communication, decisions, 
actions and behaviours are disciplined accordingly. This in turn attributes a distinct identity to 
the pattern itself (Karafillidis, 2012) and we have no come full-circle to White’s thesis that 
identities only ever make sense if they are considered in relation to other identities contingent 
on their environmental context. 
The existence of disciplines suggests that different possibilities to observe the development 
and distinguishing of boundaries exist. These observations are what White calls interfaces. 
According to White, interfaces are observations of borders that create identities, i.e. an interface 
has a mediating effect on its current as well as potential future members. What White calls 
arenas, on the other hand, are concerned with selection processes. Going back to the example 
of the playground, the selection of a child into a team simultaneously results in the exclusion 
of other children from the team. The observance of decision-making through selection and 
voting in its relation to the environment lead to a continuous re-evaluation of identity. White’s 
discipline of council ensures that identities are conserved internally and externally. Here, actors 
are mobilised, commonalities crystallise and certain behaviours are manifested calling on the 
actors’ commitment to the network (White, 1992). 
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Baecker suggests that the three disciplines cannot be analysed separately. Only on the basis of 
observations on the arena-level and the council-level, i.e. “observations of being observed by 
other observers” (Baecker, 1997: 2) can the interface make certain selection-decisions in 
relation to its mediating actions (Baecker, 1997). This means that it is essential for the analysis 
of networks to take into account all these observational perspectives, in order to grasp all 
defining characteristics of a network.  
2.3. Unpacking the essential features of networked social capital: an ontological 
conceptualisation 
The integration of social capital theory and social network theory leaves us with an idea of 
social capital that is complemented by the mechanisms and propositions forwarded in social 
network theory. For the purpose of this research, I will henceforth refer to this extended concept 
of social capital as “networked social capital”. Based on the propositions of both theories, a 
conceptualisation of networked social capital will be derived.  
The review of existing contributions to the scholarly debate on the workings of social capital 
has shown that social interaction is based primarily on shared emotions of affection, respect 
and sympathy while being facilitated by mutual and reciprocal trust. This means that there is a 
positive relationship between sentiment and interaction (Homans as quoted in Lin, 2001). The 
existence of mutual trust between actors in a network is a necessary condition for constructive 
social ties and the transmission of social capital. Trust is an essential feature of networked 
social capital that has a facilitating effect on norm diffusion and a strengthening effect on social 
ties.  
The previously developed theorisation of social capital has shown that trust arises out of a set 
of moral values shared by a community. This is because sharing norms and values with 
members of one’s community or group makes it possible to predict and expect certain 
behaviours of other group members. This in turn fosters trust among members of a group. It 
can be expected, then, that norms are actively upheld and transmitted to all members of the 
group in order to keep behaviours predictable and maintain trust. As White’s theory proposes, 
an actor’s identity is formed in relation to all other identities present in the social network. As 
such, identity is formed by gaining control over one’s environment and making behaviours and 
reactions predictable. The identity further serves as a selection criterion for an actor to become 
or remain a member of a social network based on how attractive this actor’s identity seems to 
his fellows. Identity develops out of the quest to maintain a specific social order in the search 
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for control over one’s environment. Shared customs and behaviours lead reflexive agents in 
the network to develop mutual recognition based on the norms and values embedded in the 
network. Shared customs and behaviours are a second essential feature of networked social 
capital that has a positive effect on mutual recognition and the building of a common identity 
among members of a network. 
Social ties in the form of network ties increase the amount of information available to an actor. 
Being a member of a network makes the information embedded in this network accessible to 
an actor. Being a member of a network increases the access to information and thus fosters 
social integration in conformity to the norms and values of said network. Having access to and 
sharing information via one’s social network is another essential feature of networked social 
capital. The network here has a facilitating effect on information exchange by serving as a 
“junction box” (Crossley, 2008) between different streams of information. Information 
exchange has a positive effect on norm reinforcement. 
Deriving from the theories that social capital is embedded in the strategic network location of 
an actor, it makes sense that actors in similar locations in the network have a higher amount of 
social interaction. In other words, interactions can be expected to be more frequent between 
actors that have similar types and amounts of resources. If we unpack these expectations, it 
becomes clear that in addition to trust and shared positive sentiment, the similarity in resources 
and strategic location in the network influence social interactions and thus the transmission of 
information. The capture of and access to information is shown to have an important structural 
character and thus to be contingent on the opportunity structure that arises from interactions in 
the social network. Herein lies yet another essential feature of networked social capital that is 
closely linked to the previously mentioned feature of access to information. An actor’s 
fortunate network location has a facilitative effect on the actor’s access to information and 
norm diffusion, whereas an unfortunate network location has an impeding effect on the actor’s 
access to information and norm diffusion. 
The theories propose further that the quality of social ties influences the transmission of social 
capital and in turn social integration in a way that is contingent on the context of the network 
in which social capital resources are embedded. The mechanisms behind gaining access to and 
distributing social capital information depend on the network’s historical, geographical and 
collective context, which makes the context of network formation another essential feature of 
networked social capital. The network context is a contingency that influences rituals and 
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physical constructions that mobilise the mechanisms, which encourage social interaction and 
the building of network ties.  
The theorisation of social capital has brought to light that having access to higher quantities of 
social capital or more valued social capital reaffirms an actor’s social credentials and leads to 
the acknowledgement of his social status. The theory therefore proposes that network members 
with a recognised prestige or social status enjoy a higher level of de jure trustworthiness in 
them and the social capital they transmit. Service exchange and collective action are facilitative 
functions arising from networked connections. They are encouraged by the network’s group 
ethos and serve to maintain the agents’ reputation and prestige. As such, service exchange and 
collective action are essential features of networked social capital that are conducive to, i.e. 
have a positive effect on, an actor’s reputation and identity in the network. 
Another finding of White’s social network theory is that networks necessitate their members’ 
awareness for the perception of and catering to the respective expectations that networks pose. 
The theory established that only the consciousness of finding oneself in “another” social 
context in combination with the awareness that it is possible to change between different social 
contexts creates the very contextual contingency that is necessary to forge an identity. Identity 
development and thus social capital development is only possible if there exists an overlap of 
the networks an actor belongs to. Any direct relation of an actor is contingently dependent on 
his indirect relations. White’s conceptualisation of disciplines stipulates that these disciplines 
(interfaces, councils and arenas) are distinguishable entities within one network that are at the 
same time always embedded in other networks. The exercise of social ties in the form of 
communication, decision-making, acting and behaving, are determined by the discipline they 
are located in and identities and control patterns are thus arranged within disciplines. The 
theory thus proposes that identities are forged and come into existence as the result of overlaps 
among identities from separate network populations. Network overlaps and the temporal and/or 
geographical overlap of agents is the final essential feature of networked social capital that has 
a positive effect on norm diffusion and identity building in accordance to these norms. 
To summarise, the essential features of networked social capital are  
1) Trust with a facilitating effect on norm diffusion and a strengthening effect on social 
ties 
2) Shared customs and behaviours with a positive effect on mutual recognition and the 
building of a common identity among members of a network 
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3) The exchange of and access to information with a positive effect on norm 
reinforcement 
4) An actor’s network location with a facilitative effect on the actor’s access to 
information and norm diffusion 
5) The network context as a contingency that influences rituals and physical 
constructions that mobilise the mechanisms, which encourage social interaction and 
the building of network ties 
6) Service exchange and collective action with a positive effect on an actor’s reputation 
and identity in the network 
7) Network overlaps and the temporal and/or geographical overlap of agents with a 
positive effect on norm diffusion and identity building 
This research hypothesises that social network theory introduces ontological features to the 
concept of social capital that succeed at bridging important empiricist gaps in the analysis of 
norm diffusion and norm prevalence that features forwarded by social capital theory alone do 
not achieve. Should this research find indications that the relations between the essential 
features of networked social capital proposed by the theories hold up, the research can conclude 
that social network theory has important explanatory merits that enrich the debate on norm 
prevalence and offers important empiricist contributions to bridge the gap between theory and 
real world.  
 
 
 
 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Research motivation and case selection 
This research aims at contributing to the theoretical debate on political Islam via the case study 
of Saudi Arabia. The theories drawn on for this research are considered to build the anchor 
points for structuring the scientific discourse and their paradigms and axioms are thus 
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recognised to have important functions in the knowledge generation on the puzzle at hand 
(Blatter and Haverland, 2012). Following from this recognition, this research sets out to look 
at the descriptive and explanatory merits of the theories at hand.  
As developed in the previous theory section, understandings of social capital as located in the 
facilitative functions of network ties define social capital as a resource, which is the property 
of social relations; not of individual agents. The importance in studying social capital is thus 
the analysis of its use value (Crossley, 2008). In order to accommodate this definition of social 
capital empirically, my methodological approach focuses on analysing the mechanisms that 
allow for social capital captured in social network ties to build collective societal identities, 
rather than trying to establish correlations between measures of social capital, such as network 
membership or trust, and norm prevalence. My analytical focus is thus on the use value of 
social networks for norm diffusion and norm prevalence as proposed by the theories drawn on 
for this research.  
Furthermore, with my methodological approach I intend to address an empiricist problem that 
several scholars refer to as “variable analysis” (see Abbott 2001; Blumer 1986; Pawson 1989; 
Hedström and Swedberg 1998): More often than not, research in the social sciences is 
concerned with the behaviour of and relations between agents theoretically, but the behaviour 
of and relationships between variables empirically. I agree with Abbott (2001), who criticises 
that the relationships between variables do not necessarily translate to relationships between 
agents and could even cause researchers to establish spurious associations and correlations. 
Methodological attention needs to be paid increasingly to mechanisms and agents.  
While previous empirical work on social capital has already brought to light valuable statistical 
links between proxy variables for social capital (Crossley, 2008) and its effects on members of 
a social network, little has so far been done to establish social connections, networks and 
mechanisms that constitute social capital. This research aims first and foremost at exploring 
what could create greater congruence or a more accurate bridging between theory and empirical 
work. The abstract question that this research treats could be stated as “does theory x provide 
sufficient explanatory insights into the empirical phenomenon at hand?” This question is then 
made concrete for the chosen empirical phenomenon and case study, resulting in the research 
question stated above: 
To what extent does social network theory inform our understanding of the continuously 
unsecularised politics of Muslim-majority countries and the continued prevalence of 
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Islamic norms in the political sphere as the basis for policy-making and the 
mobilisation of support for political decisions? 
The question ultimately explores whether social network theory has any explanatory value to 
the prevalence of Islamic norms in the politics of Muslim-majority countries and could thus 
provide a basis for more comprehensive explanations as well as conceptual and practical 
innovations (Blatter and Haverland, 2012) regarding the prevalence of Islamic norms in the 
public sphere of Muslim-majority countries.  
The analysis of social networks is a straightforward way to focus on said mechanisms 
conducive to social capital. However, as scholars such as Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994), 
Smilde (2005) or Gould (2003) argue, classical network analysis can tend to neglect the role 
of agency and the dynamics of social interaction between network members (Crossley, 2008), 
which could result in still too obscure accounts of network effects and network mechanisms 
specifically. For this reason, I choose to ground my analysis methodologically in the qualitative 
research methods of ethnography, while using the principles of social network theory as 
forwarded mainly by Harrison White.  
My aspiration for this research is to explore to what extent social networks can inform our 
understanding of the prevalence of Islamic norms in the public sphere of Muslim-majority 
countries. The underlying question is thus what effects norm prevalence, or rather, do social 
networks effect norm prevalence and how? Social capital theory and social network theory give 
possible explanations for norm prevalence and the empirical data collected for this research 
will serve as a test whether the theoretical integration of the two theories makes sense and 
whether it looks like the propositions the theories bring forward hold. My interest, as such, is 
in exploring research assumptions in order to establish the basis for future research seeking to 
establish causations for norm prevalence. For this purpose, I draw on secondary data, i.e. 
existing data.   
Based on reflections about the hypotheses of the underlying theories, a case is selected that 
should reflect a most-likely situation, i.e. the empirical findings from the case are expected to 
be in line with the hypotheses derived from the theories. The case selection thus requires some 
prior knowledge on the position of the theories in the current scientific debate on the topic as 
well as knowledge about the specificities of the chosen case. Drawing on Saudi Arabia as a 
case study is crucial for the goal that this research sets out to achieve. As such, the case of 
Saudi Arabia is reflective of a highly networked society whose functioning is based on kinship 
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and tribal affiliation. Furthermore, the political apparatus is structured around the Al Saud royal 
family and clearly orients itself on the Quran and Sharia law.  
The analysis of empirical data on Saudi Arabia serves as an indicator of whether the 
propositions forwarded by the theories drawn on for this research would hold in the most likely 
case. The difficulty of using Saudi Arabia as a case study quite obviously lies in the data 
unavailability and the uncertainty about the validity of data that has been collected from 
government sources. Nonetheless, since I am able to access Arabic sources that have produced 
empirical data on the ethnographic component of the prevalence of political Islam to an extent 
that has so far not been achieved in the English-speaking scientific community, this research 
explores novel theoretical angles and territory to apply existing theories to. 
No claim is made in this research that the findings of the Saudi Arabian case study can be 
generalised to other similar cases. Rather, the generalizable conclusions are drawn from the 
discourse on the theory in order to justify the adequacy and usefulness of novel theoretical 
angles to understand the empirical phenomenon. This novel theoretical angle lies in the 
consideration of the explanatory merits of social network theory. 
 
3.2. Data collection  
For this research, I primarily use the existing scholarly literature, in order to investigate whether 
there still exist gaps between the propositions of social capital theory and the empirical 
observations “in the real world”. The data is also used to identify the merit of social network 
theory and its specific analytical methods to ensure more valid data collection in the 
establishment of causations related to norm prevalence in future research projects. 
I draw on a broad array of secondary sources for the detailed outlook on the role of Islam as 
social capital in the Muslim world throughout history as well as the importance of religious 
authority and networks of tribes, family and civil society in Muslim societies that provide 
insight into the accuracy of social network theory’s propositions. As outlined above, I ground 
my research in ethnography and as such, I will draw on secondary data that the respective 
researchers collected through ethnographic data collection methods. These methods include, 
but are not limited to, participant observation, face-to-face interviews and genealogy. Data 
collected for existing research projects can have originated from various sources such as  
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- archival and statistical data found in various administrative sources at the national, state 
and local levels 
- other archival documents, such as maps, atlases, abstracts of titles, and title deeds 
- records and data collected by businesses, educational, health, social services, labour 
and professional associations 
- data collected in various types of directories (e.g. telephone, local business directories, 
special ethnic publications) 
- personal and individual data, such as diaries, family histories, biographies and 
autobiographies, tombstones, etc.   
Typically, ethnographic data will take the form of kinship terms, customs, rituals, texts of a 
native culture, and descriptions of material and non-material culture, or in other words, in the 
form of words. 
Furthermore, I use the Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Data Set generated by 
Mark Tessler of the University of Michigan to underpin the ethnographic evidence with survey 
data. Both individual-level and country-level variables are included in the data set. The data on 
individual-level variables was generated from 56 surveys conducted in 15 Arab countries, Iran 
and Turkey. A total of 82,480 respondents were surveyed; the great majority in face-to-face 
interviews (Tessler, 2014). The individual surveys were part of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd waves of the 
Arab Barometer and the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th wave of the World Value survey. For this research, 
I use the individual-level data for Saudi Arabia, which stems from the 4th and 5th wave of the 
World Value Survey conducted in 2003 and includes 1502 Saudi Arabian respondents, as well 
as the 2nd wave of the Arab Barometer conducted in 2011 which surveyed 1405 Saudi Arabian 
respondents.  
The entire Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Data Set is a compilation of 56 
individual data files. Questions on governance and political life, Islam and its political role as 
well as a number of policy issues have been included from all data sets, though it does not 
include some other questions asked in the individual surveys (Tessler, 2014). In addition to 
various individual-level variables concerning personal attributes of respondents, the entire data 
set contains more than 200 individual-level variables concerning political attitudes, values and 
behaviours. Some of these variables are a collection of various sub-factors pertaining to the 
overall concept or issue the variable concerns. In these cases, respondents were asked about 
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the multiple differing parts making up an item and each part appears as a separate variable in 
the data set. 
Finally, the Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Data Set also includes variables that 
are based on 34 time-specific country-level characteristics. Said variables include for example 
the government regulation of religion index, freedom of religion indices developed by the U.S. 
State Department or the government funding of religion index. Generally, this country-level 
data was collected in the same year in which a respective survey was conducted. However, in 
some few cases, there is a time-difference of 1 or 2 years before or after the conduct of the 
survey (Tessler, 2014).  
In order to maximise the validity, credibility, transferability, dependability, conformability, 
generalisability of the data, I chose to triangulate the several mentioned sources of data that all 
bear on the points hypothesised in this research. The trustworthiness of the data is thus 
enhanced and I demonstrate that my analysis is conducted in a way that ensures accurate subject 
definitions and descriptions. By triangulating data, I also attempt to ensure that the data is 
reflective of the empirical phenomenon itself, rather than my own biases. In the triangulation 
of various ethnographic data sources collected from English and Arabic sources as well as the 
survey data from the Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam data set lies the empirical 
contribution of this research to the scholarly debate. 
 
3.3. Data analysis  
3.3.1. Operationalisation of the essential features 
The essential features of networked social capital deduced from social capital and social 
network theory serve as a tool for the data analysis. As such, I will be looking at data that 
corresponds to the features forwarded by the theory and discuss in a descriptive way, whether 
they indicate that the hypothesis holds for the case of Saudi Arabia. Networked social capital 
has been conceptualised to include the essential features of trust, shared customs and 
behaviours, the exchange of and access to information, an actor’s network location, the network 
context, service exchange and collective action and network overlaps. In order to analyse the 
data, it is necessary to operationalise these concepts via observable indicators for the presence 
or absence of the features and their proposed effects.  
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For the analysis of data in the form of texts, the following indicators serve to operationalise 
each of the features: 
a) Trust: reciprocal expectations among agents, reliability of agents, nature of reliability, 
expressions of risk in specific social relations, origin of a social relation to be perceived 
as risky, expressions of confidence in the competence of certain actors, expressions of 
the credibility of certain actors, expressions of the benevolence and integrity of certain 
actors 
b) Shared customs and behaviours: expressions of behaviours that are typical for a certain 
group and distinguish it from others, expressions about a “Saudi way” of doing things, 
an “Islamic way” of doing things or a “tribal way” of doing things, expressions of 
expectations about the behaviour of others, expressions of negative consequences for 
deviant behaviour 
c) Exchange of and access to information: the effect of having certain knowledge, 
distributors of knowledge, ways to gain access to knowledge, ways to make use of the 
knowledge, freedom of information, expressions of censored information 
d) An actor’s network location: an actor’s connections, conditions to forge social ties, 
expressions of privileges resulting from specific social ties 
e) The network context: geographical specificities, cultural specificities or historical 
specificities that lead to a particular development of the network environment, political 
specificities that accord particular meaning to the networks in this context 
f) Service exchange and collective action: acting collectively, providing services, selfless 
intentions, benevolence, group ethos, bargaining, economic dependencies, other kinds 
of dependencies 
g) Network overlaps: the temporal or geographical coincidence of actors or entire groups, 
multiplicity 
 
 
 
For the Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam data set, the following variables are of 
interest for this research:  
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a) Concerning trust: interpersonal trust, government satisfaction, confidence in the major 
political institutions (government, parties, parliament, and the civil service) 
b) Concerning shared customs and behaviours: mosque attendance, the importance 
attributed to certain things in respondents’ lives, indicators of religiosity and indicators 
of respondents’ sense of identity and belonging. 
Social trust was measured in the Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam data set by the 
standard question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted?”  This 
measure has several limitations: It offers a simple dichotomy, instead of a more subtle 
continuous scale. No social context is presented to respondents, nor can they distinguish 
between different categories, such as relative levels of trust in friends, colleagues, family, 
strangers, or compatriots. Nevertheless this item has become accepted as the standard indicator 
of social or interpersonal trust, having been used in the Civic Culture surveys and the American 
General Social Survey since the early 1970s, so it will be used here to facilitate replication with 
previous studies (Norris and Ingelhart, 2012). All other measures used for this research are 
measured on a 3 to 5 item continuum (e.g. very satisfied, rather satisfied, neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied, not very satisfied) and thus leave respondent the opportunity for nuanced enough 
answers. 
As is typical for a survey, the answers respondents give to the survey questions may be subject 
to social desirability bias or construct validity issues as concepts that are asked for in the survey 
questions may be interpreted differently by respondents than they were intended to be 
understood by the survey designers. However, keeping in mind the reservedness of the Saudi 
society, it needs to be considered that this is the best data we can get in this context. As 
described above, the survey data is complemented by other data sources to balance out the 
limitations of the survey data.  
 
3.3.2. Method of data analysis 
I chose content analysis as the method to analyse the ethnographic data. In this process, a 
coding scheme is developed that corresponds to the operationalisation of the researched 
concept’s essential features forwarded by the theory. These codes are systematically applied to 
the texts (all the secondary data I collected), in order to identify indications to prove or disprove 
the assumptions or hypothesis. Based on the ontological conceptualisation of networked social 
capital, the following coding scheme has been developed for the content analysis: 
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Basic Themes 
(indicators) 
         Organising themes 
           (features) 
        Global themes 
 
n this classification of basic themes, organizing themes and global themes, each of the codes 
finds its place in a relationship, influence or maybe a hierarchy. Basic themes have something 
in common. Organizing themes link the basic themes together, i.e. they describe what the basic 
themes have in common. Finally, the global theme summarizes organising themes together 
under an overarching theme. By deriving from the group-codes how different features may 
relate to one another or influence each other, maybe create hierarchies and orders etc., the 
coding serves as an analytical commentary on the topic of my research. The description of the 
connection between the features is the main result of the research, leading to conclusions about 
the explanatory merit of social network theory’s propositions.  
For the data gathered from the Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam data set, I use 
descriptive statistics as an analytical method. Beside the fact that I want to stick to qualitative 
data analysis methods for the purpose of this research, it is not really possible to conduct more 
elaborate statistical analysis with the data set. The data available to us describes only a fraction 
of the entire empirical phenomenon; the context is very fuzzy. I do not intend to establish 
causations between variables, nor is it possible to, since I can’t control for all necessary 
conditions in order to establish causality, nor can I analyse reversed causalities (e.g. does the 
absence of trust result in the absence of social ties and social capital transmission). The survey 
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data is however important to underpin and support the ethnographic data and give more reliable 
indications about the proposition forwarded by the theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. The case of Saudi Arabia – an introduction 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as we know it today, was established by King Abdulaziz Ibn 
Saud in 1932. Rallying for support of tribal and religious leaders was crucial for securing the 
independence of his Kingdom (al-Seflan, 1980). Long before the founding of the Kingdom of 
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Saudi Arabia, political power had been shared between rulers of the Arabian peninsula and 
religious scholars. Until today, this remains the case in Saudi Arabia. As such, while the 
incumbent Saudi monarch is on paper the country’s supreme religious leader and custodian of 
the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, in practice he shares this power with the ‘ulama, a group 
of influential spiritual contemporaries that hold positions as judges, lawyers and prayer leaders 
(Obeid, 1999). 
While political power lay in the family of the Al Saud, religious power lay in the family of Ibn 
Abd Al Wahhab; founder of the strict interpretation of Islam known as Wahhabism that carries 
the Saudi state. Intermarriages between the two families secured the Kingdom’s stable social 
basis that has spared the country the havoc of civil uprisings and revolutions that plagued many 
neighbouring countries (Obeid, 1999).  
While largely avoiding civil unrest, the kingdom nonetheless underwent a phase of liberal 
experimentation and openness to the West throughout the 1960s and 70s. With an attack on the 
Grand Mosque in Mecca executed by critics of the royal establishment and the success of the 
Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, a conservative revival was ignited. The attack on the Grand 
Mosque was interpreted as a call for less ostentation on the part of the royal family and a call 
for putting an end to “polluting” Islamic culture by forging closer ties to the West (Global 
Security2).  
4.1. The functioning of the Saudi political apparatus  
The Saudi state structure was created swiftly and by only a few royals in a top-down approach. 
The state apparatus grew and drew oil-funded clients into it. This served as a means to control 
the society. The royal family had the complete budgetary power and could expand the state 
institutions as they wished, resulting in a foggy existence of institutions with overlapping 
responsibilities. In general, a hierarchical, vertically organized hub-and-spoke system with the 
Al Saud patrons as a common denominator developed. The rentier system made society divided 
into congeries of clienteles, leaving them with no weight to outbalance the regime (Hertog, 
2011).  
Hertog describes this form of Saudi Clientelism as segmented Clientelism: “a heterogeneous 
system of formal and informal, rent-based Clientelism in which vertical links dominate” (2011: 
                                                          
2 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/sa-ulama.htm 
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24). The state structures are characterized by mistrust and personal intermediation. The Saudi 
state in the 50s witnessed “the co-optation of social forces characteristic of rentier states […] 
on a small scale, tilting the balance of power as rentier theory posits” (Hertog, 2011: 44). The 
Saudis knew no public space to negotiate over abruptly augmenting state budgets. Few Saudis 
were knowledgeable enough to develop state administration coherently. Social mobilization 
was low. As compared to existing theories on the of rentier-state craft, the Saudi case shows a 
great propensity for path dependency (Hertog, 2011).  
The institutions and administration were characterized by accommodation to personal needs 
and conflicts on all levels of government. The institutions became “fiefdomized” and the 
ministers their patrons. Institutional change was often a result of personal luck of princes and 
the decisions of the ruling family greatly influenced the composition of the bureaucracy and 
social mobility. Oil riches only expanded the choice of institutions and it became problematic 
to treat all institutions as an aggregate state body. The more oil money there was, the more 
institutions were endowed with funds, the more clients clustered around the royals and 
ultimately the more brokerage increased (Hertog, 2011).  
The oil boom in the 70s solidified the bureaucracy and meritocracy as well as Clientelism were 
boosted. A new strata of middle men emerged and the whole of the society were quasi-stake 
holders in the state’s affairs. The outcome of developments until the mid-80s was “a large and 
[…] immobile conglomerate of huge clienteles […] Full control over society had created full 
immobility of the state” (Hertog, 2011: 83). Brokerage of state resources pervaded all of 
society, always organized around the soft authority and redistributive role of the state. Informal 
brokerage with the bureaucrats that held the keys to social benefits became unavoidable. The 
uncircumventable bureaucracy and sponsorship system made it very difficult for foreign 
investors and entrepreneurs to establish themselves on the ground; the system clearly favoured 
local businesses (Hertog, 2011).  
Oil wealth also made social stratification and gender separation in all domains of life possible. 
A production state could never have afforded excluding 50 percent of its workforce from the 
labour market. The petrodollars helped fund the religious educational and judicial system to 
uphold this social segmentation. It was only in the mid-80s that these establishments posed a 
cost that was too huge to bare in comparison to the benefits it yielded. For example, the Islamic 
court, which had been constructed for the whole state to depend on it, declared mortgages 
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questionable in Islamic terms and Saudis were increasingly dependent on government funding, 
which grew scarce (Hertog, 2011).  
The power of the ‘ulama and the preservation of religious force has also greatly complicated 
the work of the private sector, for example through the religious dominated school curricula, 
producing no suitable successors to businesses. Reforms throughout the 80s aimed at increasing 
the private sector’s role in development and job creation, but the leadership’s unwillingness to 
reform and the private sector’s lack of higher managerial capacities hampered this idea. “In the 
1980s and 1990s, [the government] mostly busied itself with putting out fires from crisis to 
crisis” by throwing money at the problems, “while little substantial change was initiated” 
(Hertog, 2011: 129).  
The 1990/1 Gulf War necessitated a decrease of utility prices, as well as unreasonable 
promotions in the civil service sector, in order to meet civil unrest after the war. In the 90s, the 
fog of institutions was characterized by “parallel administrative structures and duplication of 
jurisdiction […], poor inter-ministry coordination and conflicting personal ambitions” (Hertog, 
2011: 67). After the oil crash, strong leadership was necessary, but instead the regime chose to 
hide the state’s problems under welfare showers. The state structures that once seemed 
beneficial to the royal family now inhibited business regulations that could have lifted the 
country out of the slump (Hertog, 2011).  
The 1990s economic crisis gave the impetus for reform under King Abdallah. The Foreign 
Investment Act, the Saudization of labour markets, and the WTO adoption, as well as the 
Supreme Economic Council and the Majlis al-Shura were introduced. Both of these institutions 
allow businesses to look for influence in more institutionalized ways, as Hertog explains. He 
also asks the question if there is any room for fundamental change and finds the answer that 
the debate on economic policies is more institutionalized thanks to Abdallah’s political 
modernization (2011). Nonetheless, the incoherent, unpredictable state is a problem for the 
private sector’s development and while the state had become so neatly centralized, “the record 
of reforms […] [continues to] look so decidedly patchy” (Hertog, 2011: 246).  
A more nuanced evaluation of Clientelism in the Saudi case solves the puzzle. Hertog’s 
distinction between macro, meso and micro level analysis pays off. The Saudi state’s main 
challenge was to “shift from efficiency in distribution to efficiency in regulation” (Hertog, 
2011: 247) and the authorities tried to tackle this through the three reforms mentioned above 
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(the Foreign Investment Act, the Saudisation of labour markets, and the WTO adoption). How 
did the segmented Clientelism affect the reform-making? On a macro-level it was “paternal 
centralization around the Al Saud” (Hertog, 2011: 248), on a meso-level it lead to a fragmented 
bureaucracy and on the micro level to bureaucratic Clientelism (Hertog, 2011).  
Compared to countries with state apparatuses of equal size, the Saudi state stands out in the 
degree to which it is present in peoples’ everyday life and to which its resources curtail social 
mobilization. Political activation remains low, authority is based on patronage and the state 
acts as a “patron of patrons” (Hertog, 2011: 259). “The particular Saudi constellation, 
combining macro- and meso-dominance of the state with micro-penetration of society” 
(Hertog, 2011: 260) is what explains the peculiarities of Saudi Arabia’s political system. 
Different types of states encounter different social constraints. Saudi Arabia as a fragmented 
rentier state experiences this only on the micro-level. Features of developing countries are 
present, but in a unique constellation. It is important to distinguish the levels in order to 
understand the Saudi conundrum; why it appears on the one hand penetrated and constrained, 
and on the other isolated in terms of political reform (Hertog, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Data analysis  
38 
 
The following pages will lay out the empirical observations gathered from ethnographic 
sources and the Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Data Set. I will present the 
empirical evidence gathered and coded that indicates whether the relationships between the 
features of networked social capital observed are as theorised in social network theory and 
social capital theory. Based on the level of congruence between the empirical observations and 
the theoretical propositions, conclusions about the explanatory merits of social network theory 
as a complement to social capital theory in the case of the prevalence of Islamic norms in the 
public sphere of Saudi Arabia will be drawn.  
5.1. Trust’s facilitating effect on norm diffusion and its strengthening effect on 
social ties 
In their account of Muslim politics, Eickelmann and Piscatori (2004) argue that “dynamic civil 
society can exist without formal political organisations because pervasive informal 
organisational structures often serve as the framework for effective political, social and 
economic action” (Eickelmann and Piscatori, 2004: 160). Professional, religious, political or 
economic ties form networks that spread information about and interpretations of Islam. The 
collective existence of such networks works to constrain the arbitrariness of the state and the 
degree of control exercised by it, even without centralised action or formal leadership. These 
findings indicate that the government is seen as controlling and inconsistent or subjective by 
its citizens, which in turn may be interpreted as untrustworthy. Networks on the basis of 
professional, religious, political or economic ties are ways through which citizens can keep the 
government’s whims at bay. As Bill describes, these informal networks are shaped and re-
shaped according to the interests of their members and the stability of networks is never 
guaranteed; especially as many individual members often belong to various networks 
simultaneously (Bill as quoted in Eickelmann and Piscatori, 2004)3.  
The authors find that authority is located in informal networks as direct ties of trust and 
responsibility. Their studies found that this understanding of authority grounded in ties of trust 
is crucial for the understanding of Muslim politics in Saudi Arabia. So far, the findings suggest 
that trust is an important basis for social interaction, but the theorised positive effect of trust on 
norm diffusion and its strengthening effect on social ties cannot be confirmed. 
                                                          
3 The implications of overlapping membership in various networks will be further developed later in this chapter. 
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In politics, trust and mutual cooperation and obligation make a sense of civic competence 
possible via which individuals of the civil society participate in politics (Rose, 1995). When 
the surveys collected for the Carnegie Middle East governance and Islam Data Set asked how 
much respondents trust various institutions, just over half the respondents would rank their 
level of trust in the prime minister between “quite a lot of trust” and “a great deal of trust”. The 
same goes for trust in parliament and the police. When it comes to the level of trust that 
respondents express in political parties and civil services, however, trust levels seem to be 
rather low with the majority of respondents ranking their trust levels between “very little trust” 
and “no trust at all”, 
Institutions representing the state Level of trust in %  
Prime Minister 
19.2 – a great deal of trust 
33.4 – quite a lot of trust  
32.7 – very little trust 
  6.1 – none at all 
Parliament  
17,6 - a great deal of trust  
31,2 - quite a lot of trust  
34,9 - very little trust 
  6,8 - None at all  
The police 
18,4 - a great deal of trust  
34,2 - quite a lot of trust 
31,0 - very little trust  
  7,1 - None at all   
Political parties 
  8,3 - a great deal of trust 
13,5 - Quite a lot of trust  
46,1 - Very little trust  
14,4 - None at all   
Civil services 
  8,1 - A great deal of trust  
24,0 - Quite a lot of trust  
45,7 - Very little trust  
10,3 - None at all  
Source: Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Data Set 
When asked about the level of trust in mosques and churches, respondents report levels of trust 
that seem to be much higher than the trust in state institutions. 80,4% of respondents have a 
great deal of trust or quite a lot of trust in mosques and churches. The good majority (66.4%) 
of respondents further indicates that they believe most people cannot be trusted. 94.2% of 
respondents also indicate that family and friends are very important to them, whereas the 
majority ascribes low levels of importance to politics. These findings support the findings of 
previously mentioned studies that found that Saudis have more trust in their private networks 
of economic, professional or religious ties than they have in their government. 
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 Level of importance in %  
Family 
94.2 – very important 
  4.9 – rather important  
  0.8 – not very important 
  0.2 – not important at all 
Friends  
29.6 – very important 
51.2 – rather important  
16.4 – not very important 
  2.7 – not important at all 
Politics 
19.2 – very important 
28.0 – rather important  
31.4 – not very important 
21.4 – not important at all 
Source: Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Data Set 
While the majority of Saudis has a good level of trust in the Prime Minister, the parliament and 
the police, the reported distrust in political parties and civil services mirrors a distrust in the 
government’s responsiveness and its capacity to adequately represent citizens and provide 
services to them. Only 37.6% of respondents indicate that they are satisfied (10.4% say very 
satisfied and 27.2% say rather satisfied) with the performance of the current government. In 
combination with the distrust in the wider society and the level of importance ascribed to 
friends and family, the findings suggest that the majority of Saudis does not rely on formal 
state institutions to tackle societal issues, but rather draw on their personal ties in whom they 
trust. In this data, we find indications for the proposed strengthening effect of trust on social 
ties: As citizens have little trust in the government’s ability to provide services, Saudis have to 
strengthen their private networks in whom they trust in order to have reliable support to tackle 
societal issues.  
In conjunction, the empirical observations from historical sources and the Carnegie Middle 
East Governance and Islam Data Set indicate that trust is indeed an important basis for social 
interaction and has a strengthening effect on social ties. It was expected that the existence of 
mutual trust between actors in a network is a necessary condition for constructive social ties 
and the transmission of social capital. Levels of trust in the government’s ability to provide 
social services to Saudi citizens and represent the citizens politically have been found to be 
low. A lack of trust in the government and its provision of services to Saudi citizens leads 
Saudis to strengthen social ties to individuals in whom they trust to fill the gaps left by the 
state. No concrete data has been found to support the claim that trust has a positive effect on 
norm diffusion 
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5.2.The positive effect of shared customs and behaviours on mutual recognition and 
the building of a common identity 
As Thornton (2015) finds in his study on tribal mentalities, among the tribes of Arabia, there 
is almost no notion of a universal humanity that transcends ethnic origin and cultural 
specificity. Common principles that all of human kind could adhere to don’t exist and it is only 
in the customs and norms of the tribe – the ‘tribal way of doing things’-  that identity is forged. 
“Loyalty is not to principle, but to blood” (Thornton, 2015) and members of a tribe were usually 
exhorted to conquer and destroy outsiders who do not conform to the tribe’s understanding of 
justice and morality (Thornton, 2015).  
This principle of honour is one of the most important principles of Arab Tribalism. 
Transgressions against honour are to be avenged by the entire tribe and the entire group or tribe 
that the transgressor belongs to can be held accountable for the wrongdoing. The behaviours 
resulting from these tribal norms are still visible today in contexts that have long broken out of 
the boundaries of the tribe and infiltrated the entire society (Durkhan, 2015). As Shkolnik 
(2012) finds in his account on tribal cultures and the Islamic awakening, the greatly emphasised 
importance of honour rests on a tribe’s member’s reputation as loyal to his tribe and fulfilling 
the social norms of the tribe by contributing to the tribal community. An individual’s integrity 
and autonomy are thus the main pillars his honour and respect rests upon. Thornton (2015) 
argues that this spread of tribal norms into the whole of Saudi Arabian society is the effect of 
Islam “theologising” the tribal mentality and redefining the tribe as the entire Umma of 
Muslims, “creating in effect a ‘super tribe’ that transcends mere blood as the bonding agent” 
(Thornton, 2015). Having been socialised in conformity to the tribal norms and values has led 
to a widespread conformity to its norms and according behaviour among Saudis:  
“The privileging of men in polygamy, honour killings, social restrictions on women, the 
disdain for the infidel ‘other’ in the Koranic [sic] belief that Muslims are the ‘best of 
nations’, the betrayal of alliances in the religious sanction of lying to infidels (taqiyya), 
and the obsession with ‘honour’ that today we find in violent Muslim reactions to 
“blasphemy” against Mohammed or the Koran [sic]” (Thornton, 2015)  
Cooke and Lawrence (2005) in their study of Muslim networks find that the image of a 
networked Islamic community characterised by the shared customs of pilgrimage, Islamic 
practice, a genealogical connection to the Prophet Mohamed and moral solidarity continued to 
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have public significance in the new age of publication and print. The consideration of the 
Muslim community as a collection of earnest individuals righteously guided by networks of 
‘ulama and acts of sacrifice and devotion were distributed by the press and the defining 
characteristics of Muslim society were now both locally rooted and universally lived. As such, 
the symbolic centre of this never completed network of actions lay in the shared symbols 
representing Muslim devotion and faith, no matter how far away these symbols were situated 
(Cooke and Lawrence, 2005).  
The findings indicate that shared customs and practices indeed lead the reflexive agents in a 
network (in this case the tribe and the extended idea of the tribe in the Umma) to recognise 
each other’s honour and extend respect to those that act in accordance with the tribe’s customs 
and norms. It is proposed by social network theory that identity develops out of the quest to 
gain control over one’s environment and making behaviours and reactions predictable. 
Actively upholding and transmitting shared norms and customs serve to meet this end. The 
findings indicate that shared customs and behaviours not only have a positive effect on mutual 
recognition, but also on the building of a common identity among members of a tribe and the 
wider Umma. As Thornton observes in his study, the tribe or the Muslim Umma as a group 
exists in-itself and for-others that can observe it. Common practices make the group an entity 
for-itself and a collective identity begins to shape based on shared rituals. Once the group began 
to exist for-itself, members of the tribe and the Umma are able to demand loyalty to the group’s 
norms, values, customs, rituals and behaviours from each other. Crossley refers to this as a 
“vocabulary of motive” (Crossley, 2008), which network members use in an attempt to steer 
the conduct of themselves and others. Researchers from Kind Saud University in Riyadh 
conclude in their study on social stratification in Saudi Arabia that the tribal system is indeed 
a system in-itself and for-itself. They equate the concept of tribe with the concept of class in 
Western societies that are the basis of a distinct identity that makes a collective out of its 
members and distinguishes them from others4.  
When respondents to the Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Data Set were asked to 
name their most important social and geographical affiliation, the most frequent answers 
(45.6% of respondents for most important and 31.4% of respondents for second most 
                                                          
4 “ريغلا نع مهزيمتو اهئاضعأ نيب عمجت ةصاخ ةيوهل ساسأ يه برغلا يف ةقبطلا لثم يبرعلا جيلخلا يف ةليبقلا :هتاذلو هتاذ يف ماظن هنأ”, 
جئاتنلا ـ بابسلأا ـ رهاظملا ـ لاكشلأا :يبرعلا جيلخلا لود يف ةيعامتجلاا ةيقبطلا 
(http://faculty.ksu.edu.sa/hujailan/in/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9%20%D8%
A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9%20%D9%81%D9%8A%20%
D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC.doc)  
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important) were that the Islamic world is the respondents’ most important affiliation and the 
locality they currently live in is their second most important affiliation. When asked to name 
what best describes their identity, 62.4% of respondents say that they are first and foremost 
Muslim and their allegiance is to the Islamic ‘Umma. 88.9% of respondents consider 
themselves religious independently of whether they go to religious services or not. 87.5% of 
respondents report that they practice their religion by praying daily, even though 81.6% of 
respondents indicate that they rarely (one or two times a month or only on religious holidays) 
attend the mosque.  
These finding don’t allow us to draw concrete conclusions on the positive effect of shared 
customs and behaviours on mutual recognition or a common identity. However, the fact that 
most Saudis identify themselves first and foremost with the Islamic Umma and Islam as a 
religion, supports the findings from the previously mentioned studies that a collective identity 
exists among the members of the Umma. The survey data provides no conclusive insights into 
whether this identity originates in shared customs and behaviours, though. The data shows that 
most Saudis do not attend mosque regularly and while the act of prayer is shared among all 
practicing Muslims, it is conducted at home and in private. We can only draw the conclusion 
that the act of prayer is recognised as a custom that is shared among practicing Muslims, but 
we can’t say for sure based on this data that the act of prayer is a necessary part of the 
‘vocabulary of motive’ of the Islamic Umma. 
 
5.3.The positive effect of the exchange of and access to information of norm 
diffusion and the facilitative effect of an actor’s network location on the actor’s 
access to information and norm diffusion 
In her contribution to the American Federal Research Division’s country study on Saudi 
Arabia, Eleanor Abdella Doumato (1993) provides her insights into the structural definition 
and make-up of Saudi tribal groups. She finds that tribal groups are structurally defined by their 
common patrilineal descent, the lineage, which she calls the nexus between the individual and 
the tribe and the pivotal element of an individual’s social identity. Over time, she observes, 
lineage and tribal membership have come to reflect economic and ecological conditions. As 
such, a male individual from a rather poor lineage (financially speaking) may marry a woman 
from a richer lineage and henceforth refer to her kin as his own and that of his children. 
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Doumato observes this as a remarkable adjustment in the Saudi view of genealogical 
relationships, as it contradicts the formerly very strict rules of purely patrilineal descent 
(Doumato, 1993). Tribal leaders sought to secure their political influence and access to 
government leaders, which according to a 1981 study among the Al Saar Bedouins cited by 
Doumato was ensured through the encouragement of intermarriages between the tribes and the 
Al Saud royal family. The ruling royals, especially King Abdalaziz, on their part also followed 
a deliberate policy to marry tribal leaders to members of his family in order to secure the 
goodwill of tribal leaders via access to their concerns (Doumato, 1993).  
Genealogical and kinship links are manifold due to marriages and divorces and such 
“genealogical fudging” (Doumato, 1993: 69) creates a congruence between socio-political 
relationships and the structure of kinship and genealogical descent patterns (Doumato, 1993). 
In other words, Doumato’s findings indicate that the socio-economic positions of individuals 
in the Saudi society are mirrored by their position in the tribal and kinship network. 
Eric Hooglund (1993) conducted a very comprehensive genealogical account of the Al Saud 
royal family in his contribution to the American Federal Research Division’s country study on 
Saudi Arabia. He finds that the Al Saud family consists of about 20,000 people, all claiming 
patrilineal descent of Mohamed Ibn Saud, who founded the Al Saud dynasty in the 18th century. 
Hooglund explains that the most influential branch of the Al Saud family are the Al Faisal, 
descendants of Faisal Ibn Turki, who was the grandfather to Saudi Arabia’s first King, King 
Abdulaziz Ibn Saud. Abdulaziz’s multiple marriages bore the kingdom several male heirs. 
Those sons that shared a mother, Hooglund claims, inevitably grew closer together and as such 
political power depended on a prince’s position in matrilineal descent. \ 
With the Abdulaziz’s son Fahd’s ascension to the throne, the clan around Fahd’s mother and 
his seven brothers, the Al-Sudairi (after Fahd’s mother) became the most influential clan of the 
Al Saud family. Stemming from their fortunate positions in the network of the Al Saud family, 
Fahd’s brothers and their sons filled influential political positions in the Kingdom. Most 
notably, Fahd’s brother Sultan was appointed Minister of Defence, Nayif was appointed 
Minister of Interior and Salman became governor of Riyadh. Sultan’s first son Bandar was 
appointed Saudi ambassador to the US and his second son Khalid became commander of the 
Saudi military in the Persian Gulf War (Hooglund, 1993).  
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The very intricate details of the relationships between the thousands of members of the Al Saud 
family go beyond the scope of this research. Hooglund genealogical account shows that 
influence stems from intermarriages between clans and families, positions in matrilineal 
descent of the many wives to the respective incumbent kings, and marriages between members 
of the Al Saud and families of influential religious clergy or affluent tribal leaders. Hooglund’s 
data serves to illustrate that access political power in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does indeed 
result from network locations. It is noted, however, that especially in a monarchical state 
system where political concerns cannot be voiced in elections or plebiscites, it can be expected 
that the royal family and connections to them are the only access point to decision-making. The 
findings therefore show no conclusive insights about the promotion of networked social capital 
via network positions, but only about the access-dependent structure of Saudi society.  
As will be laid out in more detail in the analysis of data on the context of network formation in 
Saudi Arabia, the legitimacy of the Saudi royal family rested upon living life according to Islam 
and their custodianship of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina. This required a very symbiotic 
relationship between the religious establishment and the royal family, cemented first and 
foremost in the marriage between the Al Saud and the Al Sheikh that provided the firmament 
for the Saudi state5. An understanding of this symbiosis provides us with some insight into the 
connection between Islamic norms and values and the aforementioned access-dependent 
structure of Saudi society. In order to understand the idea fully, I will provide a brief excursus 
into Saudi law-making. 
 
5.3.1. Excursus: Islamic law-making 
Islamic law is considered as an “’open text’, the very ‘internal discursive construction’ of which 
requires constant interpretation and commentary” (Zaman, 2002: 38). As such, the community 
of Saudi ‘ulama uses commentary and the issuance of fatwas, in order to elaborate, expand and 
modify the Islamic law in order for it to fit the contemporary circumstances of our time (Zaman, 
2002).  
Islamic legal thought and constitutionalism is a sort of guiding principle of how Allah foresaw 
correct and righteous moral standards and behaviour in social realms. The sources from which 
                                                          
5 More on this in the part on the context of network formation 
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scholars extract this legal information are the Qur’an for one and secondly the Sunna or Hadith. 
These are the roots of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) which have to be interpreted by 
eligible scholars (the ‘ulama) in a process called ijtihad, in order to derive the Islamic law (fiqh) 
(Quraishi, 2008). Islam links prosperity in worldly affairs to prosperity in religious affairs. 
Thus, the development and progress of both are linked to one another. As the worldly affairs 
change over time, so should the understanding of religious affairs.  Ijtihad therefore has to be 
conducted in light of the contemporary circumstances of the scholar’s environment in order to 
derive a fiqh that is compatible with current worldly affairs (Al-jabri, 2009).  
The Islamic civilization always experienced the practice of politics under the legitimizing 
umbrella of religion. When it comes to Islamist movements, in the past they were conducted in 
the name of creed (‘aqida), but today they are conducted in the name of the shari’a.  Islamists 
structure their political campaigns around their vision of applying the shari’a. The root of this 
shift in the nature of extremist movements lies in politics, not in religion: Disagreement in 
creed came about in one single social realm that hosted several political and ideological 
environments, disagreeing first on the succession of the prophet Mohamed after his death and 
second on the consolidation and standardization of Islam. Now, as social systems started 
varying not only in degree but also in kind (capitalism, communism, secularism, Islamic system 
etc.), the survival of the Islamic system was threatened and the application of shari’a became 
the focus of political schisms (Al-Jabri, 2009).  
In the post-colonial Arab world, although most states reached independence, the stencil for 
state craft still is the Western one, an ideology that never enjoyed much legitimacy and 
recognition among Saudis. Significant numbers of citizens demanded the “recognition and re-
introduction of Islamic law” (Quraishi, 2008).  The original judicial system laid out for states 
of an Islamic civilization advocates a split between the so called fiqh, which consists of non-
binding fatwas, and siyasa, which are the fiqh rulings adopted as binding legislation by a Qadi, 
an Islamic judge, for the sake of creating mandatory rules in order to ensure the public good 
(maslaha). This model is not compatible with the Western state model (Quraishi, 2008).   
During colonial periods, a certain amount of fiqh rulings, mainly concerning family law, 
remained in the legislations of Saudi Arabia, but after gaining independence, many people 
asked for the official adoption of Islamic law. This is either feasible by stating in a country’s 
constitutions that the shari’a is the sole or at least the main source for legislation, as is the case 
for Saudi Arabia, or by adopting non-binding fatwas as binding laws. Evidently this raises 
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ambiguities, because interpretations of the usul al-fiqh will not always yield congruent results, 
congruent fiqh. Also, the concept of shari’a is a much larger one than just a set of doctrinal 
rules (Quraishi, 2008).  
The most important principle of shari’a is serving and preserving the public good. Shari’a is 
supposed to free man from his whims and fancies in order for him to be a servant to God 
(Chaudhry, 1998).  Of course the divine text does not foresee every single situation in a man’s 
life, which is why the ‘ulama as the religious deputies of the ruling authority of a state have 
the important responsibility to “keep civil society running, safe and orderly” (Quraishi, 2008).  
Due to this need for public order, law making lays in the hands of this sovereign power. To 
give an example: If a married couple decides to seek divorce, they shall go to see a mufti, who 
can help resolve their conflict. If both, husband and wife, agree to the mufti’s non-binding 
fatwa, there are no further problems. If, however, either of the two cannot come to terms with 
the mufti’s ruling, or there are disagreements arising from ijtihad on the fiqh, there needs to be 
an authority to turn to, which has the power to force the disputing parties to follow legal 
obligations  
In their search for fiqh, the scholars do a lot of guess work. They try to guess what the legislator 
(i.e. God) meant by his judgement or ruling and they look at him as though he were a human 
judge. But this guess work leaves too narrow a scope to define a preference for one or another 
guess that the scholar came up with. Another issue with interpretation is that the guess work 
depends heavily on language and the connection between a word and its meaning that the 
scholar creates. Decision here depend on “surmise, not certainty. Hence, all jurisprudence 
based on this method is entirely presumptive” (Al-Jabri, 2009: 83).  
It is important to understand that fiqh and shari’a are not one and the same thing. Fiqh is 
actually what we should refer to when we talk about the actual legislation on the ground, 
whereas shari’a is indeed the divine legislation, the Islamic Law with a capital L. There also 
needs to be a profound understanding and recognition that the scholars producing fiqh through 
ijtihad are but fallible humans and might not be able to articulate God’s exact law (Quraishi, 
2008).  
Correct methods to reach fiqh are highly important. Mere analogy puts the public good as a 
cause for the legislations, but fails to explain why, for example, four witnesses need to be 
present in an adultery charge or why a thief’s hand should be cut off. The rationality of rulings 
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and especially punishments gets lost. He who conducts analogy would come up with the 
explanation that a thief’s hand must be cut off, because it is the instrument with which he 
committed the deed, but would fail to explain why an adulterer’s genital is not amputated as 
that was the instrument he committed his crime with.  
If the occasion of the Qur’anic revelation (asab al-nuzul) and the intention (maqasid) of 
legislation are considered in the process of ijtihad, a more comprehensive understanding of 
shari’a and hence a more just fiqh can be derived. That way one would realize that it is the lack 
of walls in the desert back in the times of the prophet that made adultery visible to four 
witnesses and didn’t allow for thieves to be imprisoned, hence their hands needed to be chopped 
off in order to mark these people as criminals (Al-Jabri, 2009). Evidently, this kind of correct 
interpretation requires a vast amount of knowledge about the chronology of the revelation of 
the Qur’an, an intricate understanding of the Arabic language and a comprehensive grasp of all 
relevant contextual and contemporary features of Arab society at the time of the revelation, in 
order to position and interpret a judicial provision correctly. This incredible knowledge and 
experience is what ascribes the ‘ulama its extraordinary position as the religious authority of 
Saudi Arabia and its high social standing. 
 
What often irritates people studying or trying to understand Islamic law is that fact that what 
Islamic law actually says is to be found in an amalgam of scholarly articles drafted by the 
‘ulama. This is where the fiqh is located, which is about comparable to a law professor from a 
university in a Western state being able to legislate the law of a country (Quraishi, 2008). 
However, this relativity of shari’a and the need for its interpretation is at its essence and at the 
essence of Islamic life for if life were perfect on earth already, “neither life nor laws would 
have any meaning” (Al-Jabri, 2009: 94). Regarding the shari’a as an extension of God’s will 
and his provisions for good life on earth (a discussion about the appropriateness of regarding 
the shari’a as such would go far beyond the scope of this research), the religious interpretations 
of the ‘ulama in form of legal commentary and the issuance of fatwas are the moral yardstick 
and juridical compass for social order in Saudi Arabia.  
Hooglund’s (1993) genealogical data confirms that the royal family maintained close relations 
with the ‘ulama, especially via intermarriages with the Al Sheikh. The founder of the Saudi 
dynasty, Mohamed Ibn Saud, for example, married a daughter of the religious reformer Ibn Al 
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Wahhab, who was the founder of the Wahabbi branch of Islam that is the basis for Saudi 
politics. More intermarriages followed suit to reinforce the political alliance between the 
families (Hooglund, 1993). This influence and responsibility derived partly from their position 
in the network of the ruling elite allows the ‘ulama to preserve the identity of the Saudi society, 
while simultaneously giving them the authority and means to make adjustments to it via the de 
jure legitimacy their religious interpretations have. Adding to this, the monopoly of the ‘ulama 
on filtering what religious information is spread to the Saudi society reinforces this power. 
The findings indicate that in a system where political influence can only be wielded through 
access to the ruling elite, strategic network positions are pivotal and indeed have a facilitating 
effect on norm diffusion and access to information. Keeping in mind that this research does not 
claim generalisability of the data beyond the scope of Saudi Arabia, it is noted, however, the 
data does not give conclusive insights into whether network positions would have the same 
effect in a less access-dependent setting.  
5.4.The network’s context as a contingency 
Over the course of the 20th century, many Saudis travelled to Europe for academic purposes 
and intended to bring back with them ideas about development and modernisation for their 
country. The import of Western concepts such as nationalism and secularisation has been of 
interest for numerous scholars concerned with the Middle East (see e.g. Hourani, 1991, Said, 
1978). Many of them observe that the implantation of nationalism and Western modernity in 
the guise of Arab socialism, championed by the Ba’athist regimes of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
and Hafez al-Assad’s Syria, failed. The renewed trial of bringing nationalism and Western 
modernity to the Arab world in form of Gamal Abd El Nasser’s pan-Arabism was also brought 
to its knees after the humiliating defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war as well as the Lebanese 
civil war (Shkolnik, 2012). Shkolnik (2012) finds that Saudis therefore regarded the Western 
modernity and its secularist, nationalist principles as “foreign transplants that contradicted 
Middle Eastern tribal culture” (Shkolnik, 2012).  
In the global struggle over supremacy, the Middle East has long felt inferior to the West after 
the decline of the “golden age of Islam”. Shkolnik (2012) argues that Islam had always been 
defining and central to identity in the Middle East. Believing that most secular movements in 
the Arab world had failed to put the region at par with the West, the return to Islam as a political 
ideology that had brought an era of scientific advance and high culture to the region seemed 
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attractive to Arabs. Viewing themselves as the “true followers of God” (Shkolnik, 2012), Arabs 
began to once again see themselves superior to the West in at least one aspect of social and 
political life. 
Historically, identification with a territorially bounded state has always been weak in most of 
the Middle East. Characterised by an arid climate, punctuated with trading oases and inhabited 
by nomadic tribes, the region always focused more on sub-state level units of social 
organisation such as religious groups, the tribe and the city or the worldwide community of 
Muslims, the Umma (Fawcett, 2005). When colonial powers imposed borders on the Middle 
East in the beginning of the 20th century, loyalties did not shift away from sub-state identities 
and loyalties often transcended the artificial state boundaries. Moreover, a sentiment of lost 
cultural unity resulting from the newly imposed boarders gave rise to what is known as “pan-
Islam”. Fawcett (2005) finds that both, the enduring loyalties to supra-state identities and the 
loyalty to sub-state social units, challenged the political, social and cultural boundaries of the 
nation state. 
Cooke and Lawrence (2005), too, argue that the weak integration of Islamic states and societies 
gives relevance to the use of the network as “a metaphor for understanding the dynamics of 
Islamic history and Islamic civilisation” (Cooke and Lawrence, 2005: 52). They find that 
mechanisms that encourage social interaction are rooted in networks of tribal, religious or local 
affiliation much more than in Saudi nationality. Religious establishments wielded considerable 
moral influence over politics in Muslim-majority countries and such establishments are for the 
most part geographically extensive and independent of the state. Rooted in the hitherto 
described border-transcending relationship between state and society – prime characteristics of 
pre-modern Islamic history -, Cooke and Lawrence (2005) argue that the network metaphor 
captures the coalitions, alliances and social operations based on the common belief in and 
interest for life according to Islamic norms.  
Cooke and Lawrence, quoting Lapidus, further claim that the state in Muslim societies should 
best be understood as “one of the dense knots where many network lines crossed” (2005: 53), 
as opposed to an image of Muslim society as a hierarchical structure. Islamic thinkers 
themselves use the network metaphor as a prism though which to view the world: instead of a 
world with an overall pattern, orthodox Islam views the universe as a product of God’s 
continual creation and recreation (Lapidus as quoted in Cooke and Lawrence, 2005). Islamic 
history and its social order consequently are not to be viewed as an Islamic order, but in terms 
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of “movements and actions correctly performed at each given moment in accord with God’s 
will; in the same way society is an ever-living, never completed network of actions” (Lapidus 
as quoted in Cooke and Lawrence, 2005: 53). As such, the network metaphor is not only a 
useful tool for researchers to understand Muslim society, but in fact is an integral part of 
Muslim self-perception (Cooke and Lawrence, 2005).  
Cooke and Lawrence suggest that the network metaphor gained more importance throughout 
the colonial period that defined the Middle East in the 19th and 20th centuries. As the drawing 
of artificial boundaries tore ethnic groups apart, the cultural schism between the political 
apparatus and society was reinforced. Islamic values continued to be adhered to and practiced 
across state boundaries and the network metaphor is able to provide coherence to this image of 
Islam as a unifying bond in modern times as well: Muslim elites did not identify with a position 
in the imperial hierarchy, but rather with family prestige, family connections and the like 
(Cooke and Lawrence, 2005).  
Much like politics elsewhere, Muslim politics in Saudi Arabia, too, are characterised by a 
competition over the degree of control exercised by the state. This dichotomy is commonly 
referred to as the “public” and the “private” or in other words the boundaries of legitimate state 
and non-state actors (Eickelmann and Piscatori, 2004). Unlike politics elsewhere, however, the 
setting of said boundaries in Muslim politics is also mediated between religious scholars and 
tribal leaders, resulting in fluid boundaries between the public and the private. Data from the 
Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Data Set can illustrate the degree to which 
religion and politics are closely entangled and the boundary between public and private is 
blurred with respect to religion in Saudi Arabia:  
 
 
 
Indicator Degree 
Government Regulation of 
religion Index 
7.78 
(10 = High government regulation, 0 = low 
government regulation) 
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How is freedom of religion 
described?  
2 
(0 = Law provides and government generally 
respects, 1 = law provides and government 
respects but problems exist, 2 = limited and/or 
rights not protected, 3 = does not exist) 
Does the government generally 
respect the right to freedom of 
religion in practice? 
2 
(0 = yes, 1 = Yes, but exceptions or restrictions 
are mentioned, 2 = the phrase generally 
respects is not used)  
Government funding of religion 
Index 
8 
(0 = low funding, 12 – high funding) 
Source: Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Data Set 
Saudi Arabia continues to maintain distinctive features of its traditional tribal society. Seflan 
(1980) finds that altouthough having opened up to modern life within the boundaries of Islamic 
law and cultural tradition, the rather archaic characteristics of tribalism continue to be of crucial 
importance in the Kingdom. This encourages Saudis to proudly attach the name of their tribe 
to their surnames, kinship group or clan and identifying mainly via their tribe in administrative, 
social or economic activities (Al-Seflan, 1980). As Eickelmann and Piscatori remark further, 
“the religious and moral meanings invested in the family also provide a standard by which 
individuals may assess whether their governments and other social groups fit into the larger 
moral and Islamic order” (2004: 7). 
Maisel (2015) remarks that, for centuries, Saudi Arabian tribes struggled to integrate into the 
national hierarchy, even though they remain the most important traditional form of social 
organisation. Forging alliances with tribal leaders only became relevant again during periods 
of consolidating political and economic power in the formation of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. This integration represented a rather forceful process during which tribes were 
subjugated to adapting to the newly founded kingdom’s political, economic and social realities 
and were forced to accept the new authority over the territory of Saudi Arabia in the hands of 
the Al Saud. At first, the tribal groups fought the subjugation to the Saudi government, but in 
the years of rapid development and state building, the tribes lost their positions of significant 
influence (Maisel, 2015). 
Researchers from the King Saud University in Riyadh found that the tribe in Saudi Arabia is 
the basis for stability of social order. They argue that the dismantling of the tribal system and 
an evolution towards the Western-type of an individualist society would cause the dissolution 
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of social unity in the country. The tribe is a form of representation for the interests of Saudi 
citizens and any social or nation-wide cultural homogeneity is owed to the tribes. The 
researchers argue that the government’s ability to take on many of the service-provision tasks 
traditionally in the responsibility of the tribes tempted tribal leaders to enter into contracts and 
agreements with the government to share power and influence, but the historical heritage of 
the tribal system was never completely given up6. 
The researchers argue that from the point of view of the Saudi government, the tribes were 
considered as a cause for instability and disruption that keeps Saudi citizens aware of their local 
loyalties instead of allowing for a nationalistic sentiment to grow and thus stripping the 
government off its sovereignty to represent and also control the Saudi citizens collectively. The 
researchers find that the government considered the co-existence with tribes as a sign of 
weakness and surrender. Before a government existed, tribal order in a way was a solution to 
a political problem in the sense that the tribes replaced the state where it was absent in its duties 
of service provision, mediation and law-making. Some scholars argue that the tribes no longer 
need to replace the state and they therefore lost their importance and influence in Saudi 
politics7. 
The only sector where tribal groups really found recognition was the Saudi Arabian military. 
The Saudi Arabian National Guard, commanded by the Saudi King, organised its units 
according to tribal affiliation and generally drew a lot of personnel from the tribes. As Maisel 
(2015) states, while the Saudi Arabian National Guard’s first and foremost mission is one of 
securitising the Kingdom and especially the protection of the royal family and the holy sites of 
Mecca and Medina, the National Guard also transformed into “a large-scale umbrella 
organisation with hospitals, factories, and other facilities, which first serve the enlisted tribal 
members and their families” (Maisel, 2015). Researchers from King Saud University in Riyadh 
argue in line with Maisel’s findings that the Saudi state did not deliberately abolish tribal 
affiliation and tribal culture, but instead built on these social entities and used them for their 
own benefit in roles whose reach was limited8.  
                                                          
6 جئاتنلا ـ بابسلأا ـ رهاظملا ـ لاكشلأا :يبرعلا جيلخلا لود يف ةيعامتجلاا ةيقبطلا 
(http://faculty.ksu.edu.sa/hujailan/in/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9%20%D8%
A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9%20%D9%81%D9%8A%20%
D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC.doc)  
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
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Other scholars argue, however, that the role of the tribe is as important as ever, as the Saudi 
government still hasn’t achieved cultural homogeneity in the country and a nationwide sense 
of belonging. The researchers argue that the reason for this failure is rooted in the very origins 
of the Saudi state, i.e. military expansion, a highly diverse cultural and regional nature of the 
society as well as the primitive view of power as belonging to the conquerors of territory9. The 
researchers found that tribes continued to view nationalism as a threat to their power, which 
they argue, is the underlying reason for keeping leadership decentralised and strengthening 
those regional power bases that could weaken those who hold political decision-making power.  
About one hundred tribes with numerous sub-tribes of “different size, origin and influence” 
(Maisel, 2015) make up the Saudi Arabian tribal landscape today. Having originated from 
sedentary nomadic lifestyles, most tribes today live in urbanised or rural areas. Areas with a 
high concentration of tribal settlers were referred to as tribal homelands until the 1960s. Even 
though the concept as such was abolished, tribal settlers until today are especially highly 
concentrated in these former homelands, thus dividing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia into tribal 
governorates of sorts. For example, the regions around Afif and Dawadimi used to be the 
homeland of the Utayba tribe, where Utaybis until this day form the commercial, administrative 
and social elite. Likewise, the Dawasir dominate the region around Sulayil, the Shammar 
dominate Hail, and the Bani Ghamid and Zahran dominate al-Baha (Maisel, 2015). In larger 
urbanised settings, tribal domination over certain city districts exist as well.  
As such, the modernisation and urbanisation of the kingdom did not result in a disintegration 
of territorial and cultural tribalism; on the contrary, it is as alive as ever (Maisel, 2015) and as 
Saudi anthropologist Saad Sawoyan argues, the separation between nomads and settlers has 
lost its meaning (Sawoyan as quoted in Maisel, 2015). Instead, he argues, tribes distinguish 
themselves into more superior and inferior groups based on origin, genealogy and pedigree as 
well as the tribe’s original pastoral occupation, for example as camel or sheep herders or 
farmers. The royal house of Al Saud has their place in this hierarchy that is considered as 
controversial and thus gladly avoided by considering the Al Saud as the apex of Saudi society 
and granting it the status of “super tribe” (Sawoyan, 1977). In summary, Maisel depicts 
contemporary tribalism in Saudi Arabia as follows: 
                                                          
9 “ ايفاقث عّونتلا ديدش يجيلخلا عمتجملا ةعيبطو ،يركسعلا عسوتلا ىلع ةمئاق تناك يتلا ةلودلا ةأشن ةعيبط ىلإ راقتفلاا اذه روذج دوعيو
،ًايقطانمو ةفاضإ ىلإ ةلكشم ةرظنلا ةيئادبلا عوضومل مكحلا ،ةطلسلاو اهرابتعاب  ًازايتما  ًاديرف  ًاقلغمو يرصتنملاب،ن لك اذه لعج ةرظنلا ” (Ibid.) 
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“Tribalism is no longer an economic form of sustenance; instead it represents a type of 
behaviour that is based on shared values and customs as well as a common belief in the 
hierarchical patronage system. Primarily, tribal members look for support within their own 
families or kin groups. There has been a surge in different forms of tribal affirmations, self-
representations, and accounts” (Maisel, 2015). 
On a smaller scale, the family is the most important social unit for “ritual observance” and acts 
as an “influential site of religious and worldly knowledge” (Hardacre as quoted in Eickelmann 
and Piscatori, 2004: 83) between generations. The centrality and meaning of the social ties 
within the family are thus and integral part of understanding Muslim politics. Some scholars 
suggest that the role that family networks play in Muslim politics depend on the political system 
and the degree of control that a Muslim state exercises over social and economic life (see for 
example Carr and Hardacre). Eickelmann and Piscatori, on the other hand, defend the view that 
the political relevance of family networks depend on contingencies such as gender, ethnicity, 
socio-economic status and nationalism (Eickelmann and Piscatori, 2004). Carr calls attention 
to the necessity of a given firm institutional structure for individual family members to succeed 
on their own. Carr finds, that as society is in itself prone to frequent changes and the political 
institutions of the Middle East tended to be unstable, the support of the family network has to 
be considered as crucial for successful individual enterprise of any nature (Carr as quoted in 
Eickelmann and Piscatori, 2004).  
Eickelmann and Piscatori (2004) conclude from their studies that the relationship between 
family and state has to be considered as reciprocal in the aim for a comprehensive 
understanding of Muslim politics as a networked affair. In Saudi Arabia, not only does the 
relevance of family networks result out of the particularities of the political apparatus, but the 
state was itself built on family ties and its very survival rests on the social ties in form of a 
marital alliance between the house of Saud and the Al Sheikhs. They find that families are 
nodes in a broader social network that represent the meaning and values ascribed to them by 
the religious norms and customs that family members and those external to the family adhere 
to. In the Saudi case, the legitimacy of the Al Saud regime rests on the picture of the Al Saud 
family as the guardians of the holy sanctuaries Mecca and Medina. As such custodians, the Al 
Saud are expected to represent an “exemplary Muslim family, standing at the apex of 
aggregations of families that collectively comprise Saudi society” (Eickelmann and Piscatori, 
2004: 88). Alleged improprieties, such as corruption or illicit sexual activities, hence are targets 
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for regime-critics that seek to undermine the legitimacy of the Saudi political apparatus 
(Eickelmann and Piscatori, 2004). 
Fawcett (2005) observed that where the state failed to accommodate to the calls for more 
Islamic political identity, informal networks in forms of schools, health clinics and welfare 
institutions formed to build Islamic counter-societies to contest the legitimacy of the non-
Islamic state. While it could have been a matter of generations to get used to the artificial 
borders imposed by the colonial powers and accept the political organisation around the 
concept of the nation state, Arab rulers continuously failed to accommodate to their people’s 
Islamic political identity and networks of counter elites continued to successfully deploy sub- 
and supra-state identities.  
Fawcett explains that this mobilisation of opposition forces “pushed state builders into 
authoritarian strategies in which tightly knit ruling cores are constituted through extensive use 
of sub-state loyalties (kin, tribe, sect), while supra-state identities – Arabism and Islam – are 
deployed as official legitimating ideologies” (Fawcett, 2005: 157). Given the continuous 
popularity of Islam and pan-Islam as sources of identity, a state identity never developed as a 
basis of legitimacy for the Middle Eastern states. Strategic political goals and the incongruence 
of state borders and ethnic groups hinder rulers from establishing themselves as champions of 
Islamic ideas. At the same time, state identities still have not come to rival the supra-state 
identification with pan-Islam (Anderson as quoted in Fawcett, 2005). Saudi Arabia answered 
to this dilemma by “statising” the supra-state ideas of pan-Islam and made political Islam the 
official state ideology in response (Fawcett, 2005). Ayoob finds that the success of such 
“transplanted forms of Islamism” (Ayoob, 2008: 131) turned out to be dependent on the degree 
to which regimes managed to contextualise it in light of domestic contingencies. As such, most 
movements and networks of political Islam, whether in the opposition or in power, are 
mainstream ideological movements and nationally bounded. The integration of local tribal 
leaders, merchant elites and the religious clergy into policy-making was thus the only way to 
secure reasonable support for implementation of political Islam in Saudi Arabia (Ayoob, 2008). 
Scholars from King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, in line with Ayoob and Fawcett, note that 
the political system in Saudi Arabia integrates the ‘Saudi way of doing things’ and the general 
approach to the way of life. As such, the Saudi basic law of governance is drafted based on the 
social dimensions that have traditionally been govern Saudi society: ascribing little no 
importance to the role of the individual, but making the family the nucleus of the society and 
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recognising the importance of family in Islam10. As such, Article 9 of the Saudi basic law of 
governance states precisely that the family is the nucleus of society and its members based on 
the Islamic faith11 and article 10 of the law stipulates that the state vows to strengthen the bonds 
of the family and preserve its Arab and Islamic values12. 
The different accounts of the role of tribalism and families in Saudi politics and the place of 
both in the national political order presented by various scholars show clear indications for the 
influence of historical developments and geographical and political specificities on the rituals 
and physical constructions that mobilise the mechanisms which encourage social interaction 
and relationship building in Saudi Arabia. European colonialism, the failure of alternative 
ideologies to Islamism, the urbanisation of Saudi Arabia, the geographical locations of tribal 
homelands, the founding of the Saudi state on the marital alliance between the Al Saud and the 
Al Sheikh, the particularities of the Saudi political apparatus, etc. – all these contextual factors 
are a contingency for the formation and maintenance of tribal, religious and family networks 
in Saudi Arabia today. The findings thus give clear indications for the theorised importance of 
the specific context in which networks form for the outcome of network formations and the 
role of the networks themselves. 
 
 
5.5.The positive effect of service exchange and collective action on an actor’s 
reputation and identity  
Individuals gain access to Islamic symbols via their network ties and are able to transcend 
geographical boundaries and thus spread Islamic social capital within the worldwide ‘Umma. 
As Fawcett (2005) as well as Eickelmann and Piscatori (2004) find in their respective studies, 
Islamic behaviours of taking part in pilgrimage, praying, studying the Qur’an and living by the 
prophets conduct not only brings this Islamic social capital to life, but also reinforces it. Part 
                                                          
10 يسايسلا قسنلا تنيوبروب يدوعسلا عمتجمل 
(http://www.kau.edu.sa/Files/0002329/Subjects/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B
9%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A%20%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A8%D
9%88%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%AA%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%82%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B
3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A.ppt)  
11 “…ةيملاسلاا ةديقعلا ساسا ىلع اهدارفا ىبريو ،يدوعسلا عمتجملا ةاون ةرسلاا“,ةعساتلا ةداملا, مكحلل يساسلأا ماظنلا  
12 “ ةيمنتل ةبسانملا فورظلا ريفوتو اهدارفأ عيمج ةياعرو ةيملاسلإاو ةيبرعلا اهميق ىلع ظافحلاو ةرسلأا رصاوأ قيثوت ىلع ةلودلا صرحت
مهتاكلم مهتاردقو ”, ةداملا ةرشاعلا , ماظنلا يساسلأا مكحلل  
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of the Islamic social capital is the moral solidarity to fellow Muslims that leads Muslim 
networks to be a reliable alternative to the provision of social services that the state fails to 
provide (see Fawcett, 2005 and Cooke and Lawrence, 2005 for reference). 94.4% of 
respondents to the Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Data Set indicate that the 
service to others is very important (62.1%) or rather important (32.3%) to them. These findings 
indicate the existence of a group ethos inherent in Islamic networks that encourages service 
exchange. 
Volpi (2011) in his study on Islamic social institutions refers to Mancur Olsen’s argument on 
selective incentives as an important impetus to get collective action going. Such positive 
incentives in the form of rewards or negative incentives in the form of punishment are the only 
way to stimulate a rational individual to take part in collective action, according to Olsen (Olsen 
as quoted in Volpi, 2011). Social movements, such as Islamic social institutions, and the 
horizontal social networks in which they are embedded, offer well-paying jobs, flexible work 
schedules and access to private schools for members’ children as benefits (Volpi, 2011). As 
such, the purpose of service exchange motivated by Islamic values is enforced by shifting the 
balance between costs and rewards for helping others in favour of rewards.  
However, Volpi finds that the resource mobilisation theory forwarded by Olsen is not entirely 
applicable to Islamic social institutions (ISIs). His study of ISIs shows that, in fact, “the very 
provision of benefits is creating a tension between the stated aims or goals of the ISI and the 
needs of the Islamist movement” (2011: 151). For example, if an ISI sets out to provide free of 
charge medical assistance to those in need, the ISI will require a pool of educated doctors that 
are incentivised to work on a voluntary basis and the overall Islamic movement seeks to expand 
its outreach. Providing benefits to the middle class in order to meet the demand for doctors and 
to expand its membership base, the ISI cannot prioritise the needy over the middle class (Volpi, 
2011). In the quest of catering to the needs of the middle class members of ISIs and the Islamist 
movement in which they are embedded, strong middle class networks are forged and 
reinforced. As a result, ISIs are de facto embedded in middle class social networks. As Volpi 
concludes from his analysis:  
“As participants engage in ISI activities, a strong sense of teamwork, trust and solidarity 
develops and new social networks are created. By bringing social networks, Islamist and non-
Islamist, together in the provision of charity, ISIs facilitate the introduction of an activist or 
Islamist worldview to new social circles” (2011: 153). 
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Volpi’s findings raise doubts on whether it is purely the Islamic group ethos that encourages 
service exchange and collective action, or in other words whether service exchange and 
collective action are a feature of Islamic networked social capital or simply of networks. The 
findings give no conclusive insight into what really encourages service exchange and collective 
action – even if it is in the name of Islam. 
Service exchange in networks such as tribes, i.e. networks that don’t exist with the purpose to 
help the needy, has been a longstanding tradition. In her research on Saudi Arabian society as 
a contribution to the American Federal Research Division’s country study on Saudi Arabia, 
Eleanor Abdella Doumato (1993) observes that the tribal leader secures and maintains his 
influence through his ability to mediate disputes among members of his tribe and to govern the 
tribe’s members’ coexistence under the banner of consensus. She finds that these tasks require 
the tribal leaders to have “a detailed grasp of tribal affairs, a reputation for giving good advice, 
and generosity” (Doumato, 1993: 69). Doumato concludes that the process of arbitration that 
is central to the tribes existence and a precondition for taking action as a tribe, reflects the 
“tribe’s egalitarian ethos” (Doumato, 1993: 69). She observes further that the neglect of 
building consensus and ascertaining every tribe’s member’s opinion on a matter in fact 
undermines the tribe’s leader’s influence and his leadership is effective only as long as it 
conforms to the tribes expectations of arbitration (Doumato, 1993). 
The egalitarian ethos extends beyond the limits of a single tribe. It is as much the task of the 
leaders to mediate disputes among their own as it is their task to broker relationships among 
competing kinship groups, clans and tribes. Raiding the bounty of other tribes was the most 
common way to secure one’s own survival and the mechanism behind continuous economic 
redistribution that is conducive to a tribe’s status as strong and successful. Doumato observes 
that tribes sometimes refrain from raiding other tribes and instead seek the protection of their 
property and lives from other tribes in exchange for money. The tribal leader who accepted 
money from another tribe had to ensure that those who paid for protection would be 
safeguarded or compensated in the case of losses and damages. In line with the egalitarian 
group ethos, Doumato observes that the tribal leader’s continued influence could only be 
secured if he shared the soils of raids and the protection racket with the members of his tribe. 
As such, tribal dynamics are very much a client-patron relationship stemming from an group 
ethos that encourages equality (Doumato, 1993).  
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Of course, tribal leaders in modern times don’t conduct raids anymore to secure their status 
and economic survival. Nowadays, they themselves turn to the patrons of the royal family as 
clients and the relationship between the monarchy and the tribal leaders can be seen in quite 
the same framework as the traditional relationship between tribal leaders and members of the 
tribe13. Doumato draws the following parallels between the two kinds of relationships: 
“Just as the tribal shaykh was expected to mediate disputes and assure the welfare of 
his group by receiving tribute and dispensing largess, governors in the provinces and 
the king himself continue the custom of holding an open audience (majlis) at which any 
tribesman or other male citizen could gain a hearing.” (Doumato, 1993: 70)  
The institutions of state bureaucracy, a welfare system, housing grants, government contracts 
and the like replaced the direct handouts of food and clothing that used to be redistributed 
among members of a tribe. Doumato finds that the Saudi tribes have come to terms with the 
political authority of the royal family and there superior place in the societal hierarchy. As 
such, loyalty to the state was never a matter of nationalism (as has been thoroughly discussed 
above), but a matter of loyalty to the Al Saud as a family at the apex of Saudi society and as 
the focus of the Islamic nation (Doumato, 1993). 
These findings indicate that in the case of tribes and their extended idea of the Islamic Umma 
and the Al Saud royals as a super-tribe, service exchange really does stem from a group ethos 
and indeed has a positive effect on an agent’s reputation (in this case on the tribal leader’s or 
royal’s reputation as a good and legitimate patron). By themselves, the findings don’t give 
conclusive evidence about whether the egalitarian group ethos stems from Islamic norms and 
values and serves to make Islamic networked social capital a resource for the group members. 
However, seeing the findings in light of the previously presented data, tribal norms and values 
can almost be equated to Islamic norms and values. 
                                                          
13 We remember at this point the findings from Thornton’s (2015), Maisel’s (2015) and Sawoyan’s (1977) studies: A spread 
of tribal norms into the whole of Saudi Arabian society has taken place as the effect of Islam “theologising” the tribal mentality 
and redefining the tribe as the entire Umma of Muslims, “creating in effect a ‘super tribe’ that transcends mere blood as the 
bonding agent” (Thornton, 2015). At the same time, the royal house of Al Saud has their place in this hierarchy that is 
considered as the apex of Saudi society and granting the family the status of “super tribe” (Sawoyan, 1977). Maisel (2015) 
concludes that the tribe is no longer a form of economic survival, but rather a representation of a kind of behaviour that is 
rooted in shared customs and behaviours, as well as the belief in the hierarchical patronage system. 
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5.6.The positive effect of network overlaps on norm diffusion and identity 
building 
The previous data analysis has shown that networks forge collective identities via shared norms 
and values that is specific to the Saudi Arabian context. In the overlap between networks of 
family and tribe, which socialise individuals in accordance to Islamic norms, and being a 
member of a society at the apex of which the religious clergy (i.e. the ‘ulama) governs all 
political, social and judicial life, lies a significant confirmation and reinforcement of the 
prevalence of Islamic social capital. Assuming for a second that Islamic social capital were 
transmitted in the social ties to the family and the tribe, but that public life were governed 
according to, let’s say, the social capital stemming from the zeitgeist of the European 
enlightenment, individuals would be navigating through social ties that host very diverse social 
capital. The “switching”, as White calls it, between family networks transmitting Islamic social 
capital and the network of the entire Saudi society in which an intellectual elite governs law 
making and correct moral conduct (hypothetically) according to the spirit of the European 
enlightenment – thus passing on non-Islamic social capital – would lead to an individual’s 
identity being the outcome of a constant navigation process between the two different networks 
and their social capitals. As the analysis has shown, both, networks of family and tribe and the 
network of Saudi society, morally governed by ‘ulama, host, transmit and confirm Islamic 
social capital.  
The data confirms that an overlap in networks exists, but does not explicitly show that these 
overlaps in network membership reinforce an actor’s identity in continuously reaffirmed 
conformity to Islamic norms and values. It is likely that it is the case, but the data does not 
conclusively indicate the proposition’s validity. 
In addition to the overlap in family networks and the society network, another important 
overlap exists: Membership in the networks of the family and the tribe, that socialise an 
individual in accordance to Islamic norms, reinforced by the Islamic social capital transmitted 
to the network of Saudi society by its most senior members, the ‘ulama, are likely to lead to 
the desire to help the poor. As Eickelman and Piscatori show in their analysis, overlaps in 
professional, religious, political or economic ties form networks that spread information about 
and interpretations of Islam. The collective existence of such informal networks works to 
constrain the arbitrariness of the state and the degree of control exercised by it, even without 
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centralised action or formal leadership. As Bill describes, these informal networks are shaped 
and re-shaped according to the interests of their members and the stability of networks is never 
guaranteed; especially as many individual members often belong to various networks 
simultaneously (Bill as quoted in Eickelmann and Piscatori, 2004).  
Joining a collective action network that provides such services, may enforce, develop and 
stabilise the social capital attained through networks of family and tribe and the network of the 
Saudi society. However, as has been found in the data analysis on collective action and service 
exchange, it cannot be proven that the desire to help others stems from networked Islamic social 
capital or whether it may actually result from the network structure itself. As such, in the case 
of family and tribal networks that overlap with collective action networks, the desire to help 
may be encouraged through the overlap, but the findings do not provide conclusive insight into 
whether said overlaps strengthen Islamic norms and values per se.  
Whereas quite some research has been conducted on associational life and civil society in 
Yemen and Egypt, Saudi scholars only recently started publishing about Saudi civil society. 
Out of the lack of information and academic material on the topic resulted the belief among 
Western academia that a civil society comparable to its Western understanding does not exist 
in Saudi Arabia. Contrary to this belief, however, “NGOs, [the] charitable sector, and 
associations have been major agents for socio-political dialogue and social reform, and provide 
an essential arena for discussion and dissent between the governing Al Sa‘ud [sic] family and 
the people” (Montagu, 2010), in addition to their respective social and charitable missions. 
Montagu (2010) finds that despite a lack of formalised pluralism, there exists an integrative 
exchange between the government, the Al Saud family and the networks of  civil society. She 
claims that this is made possible, because contrary to most authoritarian regimes, where power 
lies outside the state, power in Saudi Arabia lies within the state, as the ruling royals of the Al 
Saud family effectively are the state. As such, there are relations of interchange between the 
civil society and the state and the civil society functions within the state, with their activity 
crossing the boundaries of public and private (Montagu, 2010). Fandy describes the 
phenomenon as follows: 
“The [Al Saud] may be hated as bureaucrats, regional governors, or heads of particular 
government agencies, yet they are loved as a magnanimous family at the level of civil 
society. It is that liminal nature of the royal family that makes it inside government and 
civil society at the same time.” (Fandy as quoted in Montagu, 2010) 
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Various scholars (see Kazziha, 1997 or Carapico, 1998) call for an understanding of civil 
society “not as a binominal element, either there or not, but a variable that assumes different 
forms under different circumstances” (Carapico as quoted in Montagu, 2010). Viewing Saudi 
civil society as such, they are everywhere; transmitting Islamic social capital through the social 
and political discussion about Islam and its traditions and about what makes liberal, 
conservative or fundamentalist Islam, that takes place not in political parties, but in these broad 
and informal networks of civic action (Montagu, 2010).  
The analysis of data in previous sections has shown that Saudis first and foremost feel loyalty 
to the Islamic ‘Umma and not the Saudi state. Islam is thus reinforced as the main reference for 
allegiance and belonging, which reinforces norms of Islam instead of norms of nationalism. 
Adding membership in local Islamic networks of civil society to the membership in the 
worldwide Islamic ‘Umma, Montagu finds that the identity schism between the Saudi state and 
the Saudi society can be overcome, as networks of civic action build bridges “where there is 
no merging of state and society as common expressions of shared values” (Clapham as quoted 
in Montagu, 2010) and the only common denominator is Islam.  
It has been stated multiple times now, that such networks of civic engagement form cross-
cutting bonds among regions with different tribal, ethnic, and cultural origins that often have 
barely any knowledge about each other. Being members of these networks only, could cause 
the identities of Saudis to be defined primarily by the Islamic social capital they get transmitted 
from their families and the Saudi society under the ‘ulama, paired with identities that spring 
out of tribal rivalries and competition for ethnic, cultural or economic dominance and 
supremacy. The shared issues that networks of civic action bring to light, allow Saudis to unite 
as Saudi Arabians (not nationalistically speaking, but socially speaking) and to overcome their 
primary tribal allegiances. The data thus gives strong indications that it is indeed the overlap 
between networks of family, tribe, the Saudi society as a whole and various networks of civic 
action that lead to the specific identity of a Saudi Islamic community. 
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6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
“The distinctiveness of Muslim politics may be said to lie rather in the specific, if 
evolving, values, symbols, ideas and traditions that constitute “Islam”. […] They may 
also include a sense of obligation to authority that has been informed as much by social 
practice as by Quranic injunction, the practices of mystical orders and the established 
schools of Islamic law.”  
- Eickelmann and Piscatori 
When looking at the literature presented on the Saudi Arabian political system, we find 
accounts that approach the particularities of the Kingdom via its monarchical structure, 
contrasting it to Western monarchies based on questions about religion, tribalism and the nature 
of power in the hands of the Al Saud royals. Then we find scholars that concentrate on the 
political economy of the rentier state and its effect of leaving service gaps that societies need 
to fill somehow else, thus being increasingly disenchanted and distrustful with the regime. 
Further, we find accounts cantered on the analysis of the oligarchy based on the politics of the 
house of Saud, the ‘ulama and the members of the council. Finally, there are those scholars 
that approach Saudi Arabia as a theocracy based on the alliance of Al Saud and Ibn Wahhab as 
the spiritual-ideological foundation of the regime. 
All these accounts give importance to the same things, but from different angles: The 
importance of Islamic values, the importance of religious authority, the importance of family 
and tribe and the search for a Saudi identity. Yet all these accounts leave important questions 
unanswered: How do individuals learn the rules, and why should they subscribe to them? How 
are organizations matched with individual actors to improve their institutional resources and 
thus their chances for survival? In other words, what are the social mechanisms that credit and 
enforce the compliance of individual actors and organisations with institutional rituals and 
behaviours in the name of Islam?  
This research aimed at taking another step back, in order to establish an understanding of the 
continuous prevalence of Islamic norms in Muslim countries’ public life that nurture political 
Islam. Where do the commonalities of the previously listed theoretical angles, that have been 
applied to Saudi Arabia so far, leave us? With the prevalence of a certain social capital, i.e. 
Islamic norms and values, as well as with important network structures that Saudi Arabia seems 
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to rely upon. For this reason, I set out in this research to explore the explanatory merits of social 
network theory for the understanding of the prevalence of political Islam in Saudi Arabia.  
Having deduced an ontological conceptualisation of networked social capital from social 
capital theory and social network theory, I continued to present empirical observations relevant 
to these propositions based on the Carnegie Middle East Governance and Islam Data Set and 
various secondary anthropological sources. We explored the positive effect of trust on norm 
diffusion and tie strength. We looked at the positive effect of shared customs and behaviours 
on mutual recognition and the building of a common identity. We discussed effects of network 
positions on having access to information and the effect of having information of norm 
reinforcement. We looked at the importance of the network’s context as a contingency for 
network formation and the importance of the networks in a wider context. We explored the 
origins of service exchange and collective action in a certain group ethos and the positive 
effects of both on an actor’s reputation management. Finally, we discussed the importance of 
network overlaps for norm diffusion and identity building. 
This research set out to answer the following question: 
Given that Muslim-majority countries show an apparent lack of secularisation in politics and 
given that Islamic norms are kept alive and relevant in the public spheres of Muslim-majority, 
to what extent does social network theory inform our understanding of the continuously 
unsecularised politics of Muslim-majority countries and the continued prevalence of Islamic 
norms in the political sphere as the basis for policy-making and the mobilisation of support for 
political decisions? 
Social network theory does indeed provide crucial explanatory angles for understanding the 
prevalence of Islamic norms in the public sphere of Saudi Arabia that lie outside the scope of 
social capital theory alone and also outside the scope of previously applied theories of 
institutionalism and political economy. The state’s role in setting boundaries for social life is 
the centre focus of most political scientists exploring Muslim politics. However, a reduction to 
this top-down perspective on policy-making and the negligence of religious authorities, 
Islamist protest movements and kin groups, for example, distorts the examination of Muslim 
politics (Eickelmann and Piscatori, 2004). Consequently, redistribution and the division of 
public and private arenas are “only part of a larger equation. They make sense only when the 
dichotomisations common to political analysis […] are qualified by a recognition of the 
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interpenetrating networks that evolve in the social and political life of Muslims” (Eickelmann 
and Piscator, 2004: 7). 
In other words, what defines the Middle East political systems is the mismatch or schism 
between the state and identity. The region’s unique combination of strong sub-state 
associational identities and pan-Islamic supra-state loyalties limit the sense of patriotism and 
loyalty to the state where it appeals to its uniqueness and notion of being distinct form other 
neighbouring nations (Fawcett, 2005). The decline of the military prestige of the Arab world 
in the 1970s forced Arab nationalism to the background and political Islam swept in at its place 
as a response to the identity gap. The Saudi Islamic identity is forged and comes into existence 
as the result of overlaps among Islamic and non-Islamic identities from separate network 
populations. The mere existence of or access to Islamic networked social capital is not enough 
for identities to evolve in their full capacity. This insight brings us to the very heart and most 
valuable and crucial complemntary contribution of White’s social network theory to social 
capital theory: Ties and identities emerge together and these ties make up the social network. 
Ties and identities are thus inseparable, keeping in mind that ties can be direct, the social tie is 
essential and constitutive to the identity. 
Many theories are designed to explain processes and they require specific content before they 
can make valid inferences. Great importance must be given to the internal interactions and very 
context-specific contingencies of a political system, in order to understand its workings. The 
value for us of a networked metaphor for Islamic civilisation lies not in its descriptive power 
to capture the essence of Muslim politics and Muslim societies, but rather in its ability to direct 
us toward an understanding of the interaction between moral images and shifting historical 
forces that the imagining of Islamic civilization has entailed. The public protection of symbols 
as acts of political devotion is played off against the conflict and debates that mark the public 
sphere. As Cooke and Lawrence put it, “[i]ndeed, the analysis of the network as a metaphor for 
understanding Muslim civilisation cannot be separated from the larger conflicts and debates 
that have long shaped the imagining of civilisation itself” (Cooke and Lawrence, 2005: 66). 
Having established that social network theory has explanatory merits to inform our 
understanding of the continuously unsecularised politics of Muslim-majority countries and the 
continued prevalence of Islamic norms in the political sphere as the basis for policy-making 
and the mobilisation of support for political decisions, further research should be conducted, 
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using social network theory to establish actual causalities between the networked characteristic 
of Muslim-majority societies and the prevalence of Islamic norms in their public spheres.  
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